3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
7.
The text of
the UK, US and Spanish draft resolution tabled in the Security
Council on
7 March
called on Iraq “to take the decisions necessary in the interests of
its people and
the
region”, which was characterised as a strategic decision by Iraq to
disarm.
8.
The draft
resolution also set a deadline of 17 March for Iraq to demonstrate
its “full,
unconditional,
immediate and active co-operation” in accordance with its
obligations
and to
yield possession of all prohibited items to the UN Monitoring,
Verification and
Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) or the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).
9.
In the
discussions in New York on 7 March, questions were raised about
how
the judgement
would be made that Iraq had taken a strategic decision to
disarm.1
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, UK Permanent Representative to the UN in New York,
also
advised
that benchmarks for Iraqi compliance would need to be agreed to
secure the
support of
Chile and Mexico for the UK’s proposals.
10.
In his
conversation with President Bush on 7 March, Mr Blair
emphasised the
importance
of securing nine positive votes in the Security Council for
Parliamentary
approval
for UK military action.2
While the
17 March deadline in the draft resolution was
not
sufficient for Iraq to disarm fully, it was sufficient to make a
judgement on whether
Saddam
Hussein had had a change of heart. Mr Blair argued that if
Iraq started to
co-operate,
the inspectors could have as much time as they liked.
11.
Following up
their conversations in the previous week, Mr Blair spoke to
President
12.
The draft
speaking note produced by Mr Matthew Rycroft, Mr Blair’s
Private
Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, suggested that Mr Blair could tell
President Lagos that,
after the
report to the Security Council on 7 March by Dr Hans Blix, the
Executive
Chairman of
UNMOVIC:
“… no one
believes that Saddam has given immediate, unconditional or
full
co-operation
and intelligence shows that he has no intention of doing so, but
that
he will
continue to dribble out concessions under pressure from our
military
build-up in
order to fool some people and divide international
opinion.
“We must
not allow ourselves to be fooled. Equally we need to be fair, so
that
Saddam
genuinely does have a chance for a change of heart to avert
military action.
So I have
taken on board your point that you need some concrete tests to
judge
Saddam
by.”
1
Telegram
389 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 8 March 2003, ‘Iraq: 7 March Open
Debate and Lunch’.
2
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 7 March’.
3
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 8 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Chile’.
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