3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
311.
SIS4 confirmed
that the second paper he had produced was:
“… about
managing the paradox of working hard for regime change,
communicating
in secret,
and being able to communicate to the world and to the Iraqi
population in
the hope
maybe of precipitating local Iraqi help, without compromising that
core and
312.
Asked about
his view that it would be important not to parachute a regime in
from
the
external opposition, and that: “The new government would need to be
broadly based
but
predominantly Sunni”, SIS4 replied:
“… the
people being toppled were Ba’athists, who were culturally Sunni …
but being
a Ba’athist
wasn’t co-extensive with being Sunni. There were a lot of Sunnis in
Iraq
who would
have liked Iraq to be run differently.
“I don’t
think at this time it occurred to me that it was plausible to
transfer an
adversarial,
party political, representational political system to
Iraq.
“… The idea
that Iraqi Shias could be fitted out with Republican, Democrat, Lib
Dem
identities,
organisations and run the difficult place which is Iraq, a place
which has
never had
stable political geography, wouldn’t have occurred to me in
2001.”150
313.
Asked about
the second paper, a “new route map”, which stated that
the
Government
Law Officers were going to have to provide assurances of legality,
and that
there had
been a serious problem there, SIS4 replied:
“… I can’t
honestly tell you what particular thought was in my mind there. I’m
not
aware of
any discussions of the legality …”151
314.
The third
paper was a companion piece to the second, providing an
expanded
analysis of
the risks and costs of US attacks on Iraq in four
categories:
•
“Strategic” –
including increased distrust of the US and damage to
confidence
in HMG;
serious strain on the coalition against terrorism; and reinforcing
the
motives and
grievances of terrorists.
•
“United
Nations” –
including erosion of UN sanctions and renewed splits in
the
Security
Council.
•
“Regional” –
including resentment in the Arab street and popular
pressure
on regional
regimes; an increase in radical Islamist extremism; a boost to
the
Intifada
and damage to the MEPP; threats to the stability of key allies;
and
reduction
of support for operation of the No-Fly Zones.
•
“Iraq
Internal” –
including the division of Iraq and the possibility that
Saddam
Hussein
might respond to a perceived existential threat by attacking Israel
with
149
Private
hearing, Part 1, page 14.
150
Private
hearing, Part 1, pages 23-24.
151
Private
hearing, Part 1, pages 26-27.
365