9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
123.
Ambassador
Crocker and Mr Prentice agreed that the UK negotiations could
run in
parallel
with the US ones, but would be “shaped by them” and were unlikely
to conclude
until after
the US/Iraqi negotiations had ended. Mr Prentice explained
that the UK’s
deadline
for concluding talks was mid-October, both to ensure there was time
to finalise
the UK
arrangements after the US arrangements were in place but also to
allow time
for the
necessary Parliamentary procedures in London.
124.
The Overseas
and Defence Sub-Committee of NSID met on 15 July to
discuss
a paper
prepared by Cabinet Office officials on UK strategy in Iraq
2008/2009.44
The officials
recommended that:
•
The UK’s
key tasks in Iraq for 2008/2009 should be:
{{training
and mentoring the Iraqi Army’s 14 Division, until it was capable
of
independent
operations with minimal coalition support (expected in
about
April
2009);
{{supporting
provincial elections, due by the end of 2008; and
{{supporting
economic development in Basra, based on Mr Wareing’s
outline
Economic
Development Strategy (see Section 10.2).
•
4,000 UK
troops would be required in southern Iraq until 14 Division was
trained
but after
that UK forces should move to a significantly different future
role,
requiring
fewer troops.
•
Mr Brown
should set out this policy in a statement on 22 July.
•
Officials
should continue to pursue legal cover for a continued UK
mission,
through
either a resolution rollover (seen as “increasingly likely”) or
bilateral
relations
with Iraq.
•
The UK
should continue to press for passage of the Hydrocarbons
Law.
•
Once
drawdown plans were clearer, NSID(OD) should agree UK
strategic
objectives
in Iraq and the resources needed to pursue them.
125.
At the
meeting, Mr Browne described his recent discussions in
Washington with
Mr Hadley
and General Lute.45
126.
Mr Browne
reported that the US was likely to agree to Iraqi demands for
an
indicative
timetable for troop withdrawals and would welcome a UK policy
statement
which
“could set out the conditions for a move from combat operations
(ending
Operation
TELIC) to a long-term relationship” and “could say we expected to
meet
conditions
in early 2009, and could then reduce troop numbers
significantly”.
127.
ACM Stirrup
reported that the UK could expect to complete its current
military
tasks in
2009, allowing transition to a normal bilateral relationship. In
discussion,
it was suggested
that the “remaining military tasks” beyond April 2009 were
continued
44
Paper
Cabinet Office, 11 July 2008, ‘Iraq’.
45
Minutes, 15
July 2008, NSID(OD) meeting.
401