The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
347.
The paper
described some activity on intelligence services, including the
IPS
developing
basic criminal intelligence capabilities in Baghdad and MOI plans
for a
national
criminal intelligence unit. There was an absence of a suitable
legal framework.
The paper
stated that oversight mechanisms which balanced effectiveness
with
accountability
were required.
348.
On criminal
justice, the paper stated that courts were “back up and
running
nationwide,
albeit at below their pre‑war capacity” and that prisons were being
repaired
or
reconstructed. There were also fundamental revisions to the penal
code and
procedures.
It described justice and policing systems as mutually reinforcing.
It identified
a number of
issues, including the vulnerability of the judiciary to violence
and prison
capacity,
which it recommended should be addressed.
349.
The paper also
contained a section on militias, where it assessed that there
were
over 30
known militias with between 30,000 and 60,000 personnel. It
explained that
the
Coalition’s original intent for militia personnel had been DDR.
However, that had
not
happened due to the violence it might provoke, the absence of
police to “fill the
vacuums”
and the complexity of the task. The paper stated:
“Since the
November 15 Agreement, there has been a tendency amongst
the
political
parties to hold on to their militias to protect their interests …
The creation of
an ICDC
‘special battalion’ and CT [counter‑terrorism] company from G‑5
militias is
a departure
from the CPA policy of seeking to disband militias but may provide
an
alternative
means of integrating the party militias.”
350.
The paper
recommended that policy on militias should be
clarified.
351.
The governance
and accountability section of the paper emphasised the
importance
of civilian control, noting that the “institutionalisation of
CPA/Iraqi civil
governance
mechanisms is falling behind the development of fielded forces”. On
police
accountability
the paper stated:
“The
outstanding issue is the question of the structure of the national
police service
and the
relationships of local police services with Governors and
Provincial Councils.
The model
currently being proposed involves a higher degree of central
control than
initially
envisaged; this has been deemed necessary in the emergency
period.”
352.
The paper
described a series of high‑level actions required to develop
governance
further
including building oversight mechanisms into the Fundamental
Law300
and
creating
security architecture to run a counter‑insurgency
campaign.
300
The
‘Fundamental Law’ is the law that determines the constitution of
government.
134