12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
undertook
to work closely with Mr Patey and the MNF commanders in
Baghdad “to
ensure that
we carry Maliki with us”.
1225.
By 27 July,
Major General Ali Hamadi, brother of Brigadier Mohammed
Hamadi
the
Provincial Director of Police, had been appointed as President of
the three‑person
Basra
Security Committee by Prime Minister Maliki.1148
1226.
For the
meeting of DOP(I) on 15 June, Ministers were given an update paper
from
the Cabinet
Office entitled ‘Follow‑up to the Prime Minister’s Visit, Including
Delivering
a
Step‑Change in Basra’ (see Section 9.5).1149
The paper
drew on recent assessments
from the
MOD and the JIC of the ISF:
“The
picture across Iraq is of growing, but variable, levels of
capability … According
to the
US‑led ISF development plan, all divisions of the Iraqi Army and
MOI forces
should be
trained and equipped by the end of 2006 … The development of
the
police is
significantly behind that of the Iraqi Army, with particular
problems over
militia‑links,
over‑recruitment, corruption and criminality.
“In the
South, the 10th Division is judged to be increasingly effective …
However,
these
forces are untested in undertaking counter‑insurgency operations
without MNF
support.
The police are a more significant cause for concern, with militia
links and a
lack of
effective political control either locally or from the centre
…
“The
overall MNF plan, which the MOD judge to be robust is predicated on
the
MNF
retaining substantial forces in Iraq until 2007 to support the ISF
… but even
that
timeline will be tested if the scale and sophistication of the
insurgency does not
diminish.
The MOD supports this assessment highlighting a number of risks
with the
plan that
fall outside its focus on training, mentoring and
equipping:
•
the degree
to which Iraqi leadership on security develops;
•
the precise
nature of the security and political environment the ISF will
face
at the
point of transition … In the South there is a particular concern
over the
level of
violence between competing Shia factions;
•
human
factors such as the experience of the ISF; and
•
the dangers
of over‑recruitment (often of militia‑linked individuals
into
the police)
resulting in an unmanageable, ineffective and
extremely
expensive ISF.
“The MOD is
continuing to monitor implementation of the ISF development
plan
and is
undertaking work to consider a limited number of specific gaps they
have
1148
Minute
Blake to Sheinwald, 27 July 2006, ‘Iraq Strategy Group, 27
July’.
1149
Paper
Cabinet Office, 13 June 2006, ‘Follow‑up to the Prime Minister’s
Visit, Including Delivering
a Step‑Change
in Basra’.
341