3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
•
a Russian
proposal to suspend sanctions in return for Iraq allowing
weapons
inspectors
to return:
•
a French
preference to clarify the provisions of resolution 1284 –
including:
{{definition of
the key remaining disarmament tasks rather than
leaving
that right
to UNMOVIC (the United Nations Monitoring, Verification,
and
Inspection
Commission);
{{shortening the
timetable for suspension of sanctions;
{{clarifying the
trigger for suspension; and
{{defining
the key differences pre- and post-suspension particularly
in
financial
controls; and
•
a prevalent
view in the US Administration that resolution 1284 was best
left
unimplemented
and UN weapons inspections were of limited value.
166.
Against that
background, the FCO recommended “a simple rollover resolution
with
a P5
statement of commitment to engage in serious discussion on how to
tackle Iraqi
WMD, within
existing SCRs [Security Council resolutions] but including the
clarification
of
ambiguities in SCR 1284”.
167.
The Cabinet
Office meeting on 30 October discussed the wider approach to
Iraq.93
168.
Mr McKane
reported to Sir David Manning that there was little change to
Saddam
Hussein’s
position:
•
“Sanctions
erosion continued with a near regular air service and up to
500,000
b/d
[barrels per day] exported outside the oil for food regime.
Saddam’s efforts
to acquire
aluminium tubes and graphite for his nuclear/missile
programmes
showed his
intention to continue to build up his WMD capability. His
division
of the
country into semi-autonomous zones and his recent dispersal of
military
equipment,
including from suspect CBW related sites, were indicative
of
contingency
plans in case of coalition strikes. But there were no indications
that
he felt
threatened.”
•
“Externally,
Saddam maintained leverage over his neighbours through
his
oil exports.”
169.
Mr McKane
stated that the US had agreed that the UK’s draft resolution
“remained
the least
bad option available” but there would be difficulties persuading
Russia to
support it.
If that proved to be the case, the UK wanted to avoid a second
veto. It would
seek a P5
statement “of commitment to engage in serious discussion on Iraqi
WMD,
including
clarification of UNSCR 1284”. If that was not possible, a simple
rollover
resolution
would be a setback: “But it would sustain containment,
just.”
93
Minute
McKane to Manning, 31 October 2001, ‘Iraq’.
343