The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
involvement,
whereby Iraqis can choose a new constitution for their
country
within its
present borders.”
30.
Mr Peter
Ricketts, FCO Political Director, sent the UN Department and others
a
copy of an
IPU briefing describing what the UK was legally able to do in the
absence
of a
further resolution.16
31.
In a covering
minute he observed:
“It [the
briefing] brings out that the Coalition would have quite extensive
powers
(as well as
responsibilities) as Occupying Powers. We would in practice have
the
authority
to do everything which a transitional administration and security
presence
would be
capable of doing in the early weeks: humanitarian and welfare work;
law
and order;
immediate rehabilitation of infrastructure. The real constraints
are not so
much legal
as practical. It would be very difficult to get support from the
EU, IFIs or
donor
countries in the absence of an authorising resolution
…
“This
suggests that it may not be necessary to seek a resolution which
authorises
an international
security presence, at least in the early stages.”
32.
Mr Ricketts
commented: “it is worth considering a less ambitious resolution,
perhaps
to be
adopted later in the process”.
33.
Mr Dominick
Chilcott, Head of the IPU from January to June 2003 and author of
the
briefing,
told the Inquiry that he had:
“… reasons
to hesitate about the day after, which was to do with the
legality
of ORHA’s
ambition. ORHA had quite a high degree of ambition in the
amount
of reform
and reconstruction it was proposing, and we felt without
specific
Security Council
authorisation this would go beyond what we were allowed
to
do as Occupying
Powers on the basis of the Geneva Convention and
The Hague
Regulations.”17
34.
On 25 March,
Mr Huw Llewellyn, a Legal Counsellor in FCO Legal Advisers,
wrote
to Ms Cathy
Adams, Legal Counsellor to Lord Goldsmith, at her request, with a
note on
why a
further resolution was needed.18
Attached to
his letter were his own note on the
main
principles applicable during military occupation, and a note on the
administration
of justice.
35.
Mr Llewellyn
wrote that it was:
“…
important to keep in mind that the legal basis for the Occupation
of Iraq by
Coalition
forces will depend on the legal basis for the use of force. That
legal basis is
16
Minute
Ricketts to Pattison, 25 March 2003, ‘UNSCR: Reconstruction Phase’,
attaching Briefing IPU,
24 March
2003, ‘Post-conflict activity: what is possible without an
authorising resolution’.
17
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 23.
18
Letter
Llewellyn to Adams, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Why is a ‘Fourth’
Resolution Necessary?’
136