The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
On 28
September 2005, the JIC assessed the security situation in the
South.889
On
the
ISF and
local governance, it stated:
“This
fragility of local governance is not new and is mirrored to a
greater or lesser
degree
across the country. We have previously judged the Iraqi security
forces
(ISF) in
the South to be brittle, largely untested and under the influence
of political
and tribal
factions; and noted that the relationship between regional and
national
government
is tenuous. The effectiveness of the police in particular has been
a
persistent
concern. Policemen have been implicated in the recent murder of
two
journalists
working for US papers; intelligence has indicated serious abuse
of
prisoners
on political and sectarian grounds; and […] some police were
conducting
assassinations
on behalf of political militias […] The scale of divided loyalty
within
the police,
and the ISF more generally, is difficult to quantify. Most members
of the
ISF
undoubtedly have allegiance to political factions or tribes: under
pressure their
reliability
will be doubtful. We judge that a significant number actively
colludes with
Shia
extremist militias.”
943.
The Iraqi and
UK authorities in Basra conducted separate investigations into
the
Jameat
incident.890
Mr Patey
met Prime Minister Ja’afari to discuss the Iraqi
report
on
30 September. The Iraqi investigation found faults on both
sides but attributed
“80 percent
of the blame … to the British”, a position that was refuted by
Mr Patey. When
pressed on
the need to take action against the militia influence at the Jameat
Police
Station,
Mr Ja’afari claimed that the Transitional Administrative Law
(TAL) gave central
government
very little control over the local police. Mr Patey reminded
Mr Ja’afari that
the worst
offenders were the CIU which reported directly to the Minister of
the Interior.
944.
The UK
military’s investigation into the incident concluded that no crime
had been
committed
by the UK’s soldiers, as reported to Dr Reid by a junior MOD
official on
28 November.891
Two
separate investigations were carried out by military officers
from
the
regiment responsible for troops at the Jameat cordon who judged
that the actions
of British
troops were compliant with the Rules of Engagement and their right
to self
defence.
They deemed that no further investigation by the Special
Investigation Branch
was
required. Those findings had been reviewed by “a higher authority”
and endorsed
by AM Torpy
and Gen Walker.
945.
At the Chiefs
of Staff meeting on 5 October, the minutes recorded a “need
to
resolve
differences” between the UK’s enquiry into events at Jameat and
those of
the Iraqi
investigation team.892
They hoped
to close the issue with a “Joint (Iraqi/UK)
statement
when one could be agreed”.
889
JIC
Assessment, 28 September 2005, ‘Iraq: the Security Situation in the
South’.
890
eGram
14641/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 1 October 2005, ‘Iraq: Basra
Investigation’.
891
Minute MOD
[junior official] to PS/SofS [MOD], 28 November 2005, ‘Iraq:
Investigation of Events in
Basra on 19
September’.
892
Minutes, 5
October 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
272