3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
the
Council. The US believed that the “best way to ensure Iraqi
compliance” was one
resolution
which was “firm and unambiguous in its message”. A resolution “with
clear and
immediate
requirements … that Iraq would voluntarily meet if it chooses to
co‑operate”
would be
placed before the Council “in the near future”. Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei had
“made it
clear that they would welcome a new … resolution that strengthens
their hands
and allows
for more effective inspections”.
541.
Ambassador
Negroponte concluded:
“Now, the
spotlight is back on the Security Council. We hope and expect that
the
Council
will act and play its proper role as a safeguard of our common
security.
If it fails
to do so, then we and other States will be forced to
act.
“The
approach of the United States and United Kingdom aims at clarity
… with
respect to
what Iraq must now do to fulfil its 1991 obligations to restore
peace
and
security in the region … what inspectors must be allowed to do;
and our
seriousness.
Without such clarity there is too high a danger that Iraq
will
miscalculate.
And miscalculation by Iraq will lead to precisely the military
action
we all
hope to avoid.
“The
Security Council faces a defining moment. The Council works best on
Iraq
when it
works together … when the Council is resolute and united, its
actions
produce
results. We must stand together and show Iraq that its failure to
comply
will no
longer be tolerated.”
542.
Mr Jean‑David
Levitte, French Permanent Representative to the UN, stated
that
the
international community had been unable, since December 1998, to
verify whether
Iraq
possessed weapons of mass destruction and whether it was “pursuing
programmes
to that
end”. By refusing to allow the return of inspectors, Iraq had
defied the authority
of the
Council. “Even though France” did “not possess irrefutable proof”,
there were
“several
indications” that Iraq had used the absence (of inspectors) to
“pursue or
resume its
prohibited programmes, notably in the chemical and biological
areas”. The
“behaviour
of the Baghdad authorities” had “given rise to strong suspicions”.
That
situation
could “not be tolerated”; proliferation of WMD and their delivery
systems, “in
Iraq or
elsewhere”, constituted “a serious threat to international
security”. In the face of
that
challenge, France considered the objective was the disarmament of
Iraq and that
implied
“the return of the inspectors and the resumption of monitoring on
the ground”.
543.
Iraq had
confirmed the practical arrangements for inspections agreed in
Vienna,
and
inspectors “must now return … as soon as possible”, but the UN
would need to
verify the
sincerity of Iraq’s commitments:
“In the
light of past experience, the international community cannot be
satisfied with
words
alone. Iraq must translate its promises into concrete, verifiable
and lasting acts.”
297