9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
support for
better governance, especially in disbursing funds, support for
“rooting out
sectarianism”
and equipping the Iraqi Army.
284.
Asked about UK
troop levels, Mr Blair said that:
“… UK
policy was to stay until the job was done, which meant drawing down
as the
ISF were
prepared to take over. Once Operation SINBAD was complete, it was
clear
that the
Iraqis wanted us to assume a support role. So if the Operation went
to plan,
we would be
able to reduce our own force levels somewhat over the next six to
nine
months. He
stressed that he was strongly opposed, though, to any
unconditional
withdrawal.”
285.
After a long
discussion about regional issues, members of the Iraq Study
Group
asked
Mr Blair what he would like to see in their final report. His
Private Secretary
reported
that he replied:
“It would
be helpful if the ISG endorsed a plan that was essentially an
evolution
of our
current strategy. If it did the Prime Minister would be happy to
give it his
full support.”
286.
On 15
November, at the request of the Iraq Senior Officials Group,
the
JIC
examined “the scale, scope and nature of violence in Iraq” and the
“will and
effectiveness
of the Iraqi Government to respond and the implications of
failure”.161
287.
The JIC judged
that:
“I. Most
ordinary Iraqis, other than Kurds, retain a sense of Iraqi
nationhood.
But their
concepts of the future Iraq are increasingly defined in terms of
their own
sectarian
interests, whether Shia or Sunni. It is unclear how long support
for a
unitary
state will last in the face of rising Sunni/Shia violence. All the
current trends
are heading
in the wrong direction.
“II.
Violence continues to escalate. The strength of the Sunni Arab
nationalist
insurgents
is undiminished. Their violence is complemented by a resilient
jihadist
campaign.
Attacks on the coalition by Shia extremists have also increased.
But
sectarian
attacks, mostly in Baghdad, now account for the bulk of the
violence and
casualties.
Al Qaida in Iraq (AQ‑I) is in the vanguard, believing their
strategy of
fomenting
civil war is working. Elements of Jaysh al‑Mahdi (JAM) are the
primary
force
behind Shia sectarian violence.
“III. The
Iraqi Government’s response to deteriorating security remains
ineffective.
Many Shia
politicians blame all violence on ‘Ba’athists’. There has been no
progress
on national
reconciliation … So long as Sunni alienation is reinforced, Iraqi
and
coalition
efforts to engage elements of the Sunni insurgency are unlikely to
make
progress
and Sunni participation in government will be
fragile.”
161
JIC
Assessment, 15 November 2006, ‘Iraq: Risk of Deepening Sectarian
Division’.
55