The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The UN had
“demanded” in 1991 “that its representatives should be allowed
into
Iraq to
dismantle his weapons of mass destruction and ensure he did not
replace
them”
because Saddam had “used chemical weapons repeatedly against
Iranian
soldiers”,
and had used them “against his own citizens when he attacked
Kurds
in northern
Iraq”.
•
The UN
weapons inspectors had “discovered and destroyed thousands
of
chemical
and biological weapons, including thousands of litres of anthrax
and
48 missiles”
before they had been “kicked out”.
•
The
inspectors were “convinced” that Saddam Hussein had “hidden other
deadly
arsenals
and the plants to manufacture more” but could not track them
down
because of
“almost daily obstruction”.
•
It was
important to “remain vigilant” about the threat posed by Saddam
Hussein.
If he was
not restrained, “a volatile situation in the region could easily
become a
world
crisis”.
•
The fact
that Saddam Hussein had been contained “for so long” did not
mean
the threat
had gone away, he was “continuing his chemical and
biological
weapons
programmes and … the long-range missiles to deliver
them”.
“How we act
is a matter for discussion … [I]t is in the interest of all to face
up to
these
threats with determination and resolve.
“…
President Bush will consult widely with his allies. Saddam Hussein
would be wise
not to
mistake this for weakness. He should not underestimate the
determination of
the
international community to prevent him developing and using weapons
of mass
destruction.”
212.
The issue
of possible UK support for US military action in Iraq was
raised
in the
House of Commons on 6 March.
213.
In the debate
in Westminster Hall on 6 March Mr Tam Dalyell (Labour) and a
number
of other
MPs, including Mr Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrat), expressed
concerns
about the
possibility of the UK Government supporting US military action in
Iraq.72
214.
The issues
raised included:
•
There was a
need for Mr Blair to explain the policy to Parliament.
•
Force
should not be used until everything possible had been done to avoid
war.
•
Others
beside Iraq were continuing to defy UN resolutions and acquire
weapons
of mass
destruction without military action being taken.
•
There was
little domestic or international support for military action and a
danger
of a
backlash in Muslim states.
72
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 6 March
2002, columns 69-88WH.
422