The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

971. The additional troops would be used “to get the new operations going

(engineering and other works)” and also for border control and training the Iraqi

security forces.

972. Sir Nigel reported the personal view of Lt Gen Fry, “the key MOD military

planner”, that this package was becoming necessary to “underwrite our strategic

success”.

973. Sir Nigel expected that the MOD would write to No.10 in two or three days’ time,

after the Chiefs had made a recommendation to the Defence Secretary.

974. Mr Blair told Cabinet on 6 May that US military commanders had changed

their attitude to solving the problem posed by Fallujah, by recruiting Iraqis to do the

policing.556 Repeating this approach in other towns where there was violent opposition to

the Coalition could help to calm the security situation. Violent opposition to the Coalition

would have to be dealt with but it was important to show that “everything reasonable”

had been done to avoid bloodshed.

975. In discussion, members of Cabinet said that the UK had influenced the change

in the US approach in Fallujah, and observed that it was likely that some of those

previously fighting the Coalition had now been co-opted to work with it.

976. On 6 May, Maj Gen Stewart’s weekly update recorded an increase in attacks

against Coalition Forces in al-Amara province.557

977. On 7 May, Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary wrote to Mr Rycroft to inform him of a

forthcoming operation “to counter and defeat” insurgents who had the CPA base in

al- Amara “effectively under siege”.558

978. The letter said that there were “significant numbers of violent criminals who will

rally to any ‘popular’ cause” who were fighting for Muqtada al-Sadr. The commanding

officer in MND(SE) judged that:

“… the insurgents are getting bolder, in part because although British forces have

returned fire when under attack they have done so primarily to enable their own safe

extraction, leaving most of the insurgents free to fight another day.”

979. The violence continued into the following week and was not limited to al-Amara.

980. On 8 May, the Office of the Martyr Sadr in Basra had appeared to “launch a

takeover bid for the city”, taking control of most of the police checkpoints.559

Maj Gen Stewart reported that in MND(SE) 8 May alone had seen:

556 Cabinet Conclusions, 6 May 2004.

557 Minute Stewart to CJO & DCJO(Ops), 6 May 2004, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Iraq Update’.

558 Letter Naworynsky to Rycroft, 7 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Op Tiger claw – defeating insurgents in Al Amarah’.

559 Minute Stewart to Rycroft, 13 May 2004, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Iraq Update’.

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