The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• Mr Straw “thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless

convinced it was the winning strategy”, but there “could be US/UK differences”

on the political strategy.

• Mr Scarlett assessed that “Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only

when he thought the threat of military action was real”.

• Mr Hoon stated that if Mr Blair wanted UK military involvement, an early decision

would be required. Mr Hoon cautioned that “many in the US did not think it was

worth going down the ultimatum route”. It would be important for Mr Blair “to set

out the political context” to President Bush.

440. In relation to the military option, Mr Rycroft recorded that the meeting concluded:

“• We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military

action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any

firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range

of options.

• The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent

in preparation for this operation.

• CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military

campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.”

441. Mr Rycroft sent a separate letter to Mr Straw’s Private Secretary on 23 July,

which very briefly summarised the action points for the FCO, the MOD and the

Cabinet Office.189

442. In his memoir, Mr Blair recorded that Adm Boyce had made it pretty clear at the

meeting that “he thought the US had decided on it [military action], bar a real change

of heart by Saddam”.190

443. In his account of the meeting, Mr Campbell wrote that Mr Blair had “said he needed

to be convinced … of the workability of the military plan.”191

444. Mr Hoon told the Inquiry that he did not have a specific recollection of the meeting

but he did not recall it as a key meeting, rather it was part of an “iterative process”.192

445. Mr Hoon subsequently wrote that there was “a very full discussion of the relevant

issues” at the meeting, and that:

“Arguments both for and against UK involvement as well as relevant legal opinions

were set out and recorded in the minutes of the meeting. All of the reservations set

out in the summary prepared by my Private Office were fully debated in the meeting.

189 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq Prime Minister’s Meeting, 23 July: Follow Up’.

190 Blair T. A Journey. Hutchinson, 2010.

191 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

192 Public hearing, 19 January 2010, pages 20‑21.

242