The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

in Basra are ready to engage in dialogue with coalition forces … but they are fearful

of Iranian sponsored rivals and want us to deliver power to them in partnership,

rather than having existing influence over the movement that they can use on our

behalf …

“As with the Sunni insurgency, it seems we will have to engage the movement

faction by faction … An encouraging aspect is that the relationship with Iran appears

tactical for JAM … While disarray in the JAM movement has helped create breathing

space for the Baghdad security plan, the empty Shia political space is occupied not

by secularists and democrats but by Iranian sponsored groups tasked with violence,

and Badr.”

835.  ACM Stirrup visited Iraq between 13 and 16 May.454 He was reported to have

sensed:

“… that the Iraqis are increasingly in a position to take on responsibility for their own

problems and therefore they might wish to look to propose the south of the country

as a model through which we can recommend a drawdown of forces.”

836.  During the visit, Lt Gen Lamb told ACM Stirrup that he “saw increasing signs from

MAS/JAM that they could be closer to a non violent approach and some moderation of

a significant proportion of their number”.

837.  Mr Asquith told ACM Stirrup when they met in Baghdad that he was concerned

that the campaign plan was “hung up on sectarianism”. This meant that “we should

be careful to demonstrate a degree of humility when dealing with these sensitive

issues” in discussion with Iraqi politicians. There was an underlying fear of a return

to Ba’athification in the minds of the Shia politicians and that affected much of their

thinking. Mr Asquith suggested that perhaps there was a need for an “outside figure

to help deliver something meaningful on reconciliation”.

838.  On 16 May, at the request of the FCO, the JIC assessed the effectiveness of the

Iraqi Government, including progress on security and national reconciliation.455

839.  The JIC judged that:

“I. … Violence continues to rise, distrust is deepening between and within

increasingly sectarian communities, and government capacity remains weak.

There has been no tangible progress on national reconciliation.”

840.  Poor security, especially in Baghdad and central Iraq, was judged to have deterred

political reconciliation and prevented economic reconstruction, although “most of the

Kurdish north remains quiet and parts of southern Iraq have seen attack levels fall”.

454  Minute Poffley to PSSC/SofS [MOD], 17 May 2007, ‘CDS Visit to Iraq 13‑16 May 07’.

455  JIC Assessment, 16 May 2007, ‘The Iraqi Government: One Year On’.

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