8 | The
invasion
531.
The draft
listed six constraints on UK military planning resulting from
unresolved
elements in
pre-invasion preparation:
•
there was
unlikely to be a Security Council mandate for Phase IV in place
for
several
weeks;
•
in the
absence of a mandate, military operations would “in varying degree,
be
both
directed and constrained by the Hague and Geneva
Conventions”;
•
an
uncertain strategic context that was likely to change over
time;
•
the
duration and impact of war-fighting would set the conditions in
which Phase
IV would
begin;
•
the need
for the operational design to be “broadly consistent with the
US
approach”;
and
•
the need
for force levels to “conform to endorsed scales of effort”. There
was
“a
recognised need for additional forces in Iraq to secure ground
already
taken, show
Iraq-wide Coalition presence and provide CFLCC with
operational
flexibility”.
The US planned a significant uplift in combat power, but not for
a
month.
532.
The draft
listed 10 “key deductions”:
“a. The
strategic context to the operation lacks certainty.
Internationalisation is likely
to be slow
as nations take a view on the likelihood of overall success
before
committing
themselves.
b.
The
operational design must be sufficiently flexible to remain coherent
within
an ill-defined
strategic context which is likely to change.
c.
The posture
and disposition of US and UK forces when combat operations
are
complete or
when a surrender is concluded will be uncertain.
d.
On
completion of combat, forces will be located in areas of operations
for which
they will
have legal and military responsibilities which cannot be
relinquished
until
handed over to a relieving force.
e.
CFLCC will
adjust force dispositions on completion of Phase III and
establish
an Iraq-wide
Coalition presence. The Coalition will be thinly spread and the
UK
will be
expected to take its share of the risk/burden in order to establish
a safe
and secure
environment.
f. On
completion of Phase III, UK forces will be allocated an AOR within
which the
legal and
other obligations of an Occupying Power must be met. The AOR
may
not necessarily
be contiguous from the outset, but we should aim for this
as
soon
as possible.
g. If there
is no effective governance in place, forces will have
responsibilities for
co‑ordinating,
and in some cases delivering, many aspects of life in
Iraq.
h.
The
military role in support of the civil sector could be
prolonged.
95