9.2 | 23 May 2003 to June 2004

–– The Iraqi people will embrace and remain committed to electoral reform.

–– The Iraqi people will support a united national government structure.”

143. Cabinet Office officials commented that the plan did not include dates for the

restoration of fully sovereign Iraqi government. It also lacked reference to macro-

economic management, exaggerated the role of the free market, lacked reference to the

environment and did not include proper linkage to resolution 1483.

144. In the course of the AHMGIR’s meeting on 26 June, an FCO official emphasised

the importance of keeping Shia groups on board.55 In discussion it was observed that

CPA attention was focused on Baghdad at the expense of the South.

145. The AHMGIR agreed that the UK should continue to ensure the involvement

of Iraqis and the UN in the formation of a viable, credible and representative Interim

Administration in a manner consistent with resolution 1483.

146. Ministers agreed that officials should push for improvements to the CPA Strategic

Plan, particularly on macro-economic issues and linkage to resolution 1483 but did not

specifically address the absence in the plan of indicative dates for the restoration of a

sovereign government.

147. Ministers also asked for a weekly assessment of progress in “each of the key

areas” and a daily update. Reports should bring out what was being done in the South,

what MOD and DFID could do and what would need CPA intervention.

148. Cabinet met immediately after the AHMGIR on 26 June.56

149. Mr Straw told his Cabinet colleagues that Ambassador Bremer “intended to bring

the Iraqi Political Council into being by the end of July, together with a Constitutional

Convention”. Summing up the meeting, Mr Blair observed that “the coming months

would show more clearly the improvements being made”.

150. Mr Hoon told Cabinet that the preliminary view was that the incidents in

Majar al-Kabir were isolated and would not affect the way British forces undertook

their security duties in southern Iraq. The issue of bringing to justice those

responsible for the killings remained.

151. After Mr Straw had updated Cabinet on reconstruction in Iraq, Mr Blair summed

up that the killings were “a tragic event, but the fact was that rebuilding Iraq was a

difficult task”.

152. On 26 June, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, the most senior authority in the Iraqi Shia

community, issued a fatwa stating that the CPA did not have jurisdiction to select the

55 Minutes, 26 June 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

56 Cabinet Conclusions, 26 June 2003.

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