The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
himself
raise with Rumsfeld [Mr Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense]
in their
next
regular phone call next week.”52
165.
The subsequent
advice and discussions on post-conflict issues are
addressed
in Section
6.5.
166.
Asked whether
Ministers were given a paper or briefing on the operational
risks
and what
might go wrong, Lord Boyce told the Inquiry:
“Certainly
as far as the defence Ministers were concerned, they were aware of
what
our plans
were and what the pluses and where might be the pinch points on
any
plan and
what we were doing to ensure those were mitigated as far as
possible.”53
167.
Asked how the
risks had been described to Ministers, Lord Boyce
replied:
“… it would
have been done in the normal sort of way. You would have done
threat
assessments,
worked out what the potential opposition forces might be,
their
dispositions,
what our capability was matched against that. Some of the risk …
was
mitigated
by the fact that we were going to be operating in our own area …
while the
American
forces drove for Baghdad …
“There were
additional problems … for example, the importance of making a
very
fast entry
to secure the oilfields … which were different than we had in the
North.”54
168.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit told the Inquiry that a “full briefing” had been provided to
Ministers
“as to
whether there was indeed a winning concept now”; subject to the
resolution of
questions
on the legal base and post-conflict issues.55
169.
Sir Kevin
added that issues such as managing targeting to minimise the risks
to
civilians
and intensive fighting within Baghdad, “were considered very
carefully”.56
170.
Asked how the
various risks had been highlighted to Ministers, Gen Reith told
the
Inquiry
that PJHQ had “produced various papers, looking at each aspect in
terms of
risk”,
including casualty predictions.57
171.
Lt Gen Fry
told the Inquiry that there had been “a growing and …
demonstrable
requirement
for something that could act as a flank guard to American …
manoeuvre”,
and the
“lack of … combat power” resulting from the decision to hold the US
4th Infantry
Division in
the Mediterranean had “created an opportunity into which British
forces
52
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
53
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 92.
54
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, pages 93-94.
55
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 96.
56
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 97.
57
Private
hearing, 15 January 2010, pages 55-56.
58
Public
hearing, 16 December 2009, page 26.
410