The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

783.  In his post-operation report, AM Burrridge drew attention to the risks which

might have arisen because directives on targeting and ROE were only issued

shortly before operations began.

784.  AM Burridge produced his post-operation report on 8 May 2003.270 On lessons

identified, he wrote that the MOD was “understandably reluctant to press for legal advice

at the highest level on issues relating to the jus in bello before the Attorney General had

advised on the jus ad bellum”. The impact was “that a significant number of assumptions

had to be made in the planning process which, had they been wrong, might have had

a serious impact upon the conduct of the operation”.

785.  AM Burridge continued:

“Several key directives (ROE and Targeting in particular) were issued only shortly

before operations began, and certainly too late for safe implementation had they

contained significant changes. While the traditional Law of Armed Conflict provided

at least the hymn sheet, many questions remained outstanding, and some of the

staffing issues (such as targeting delegations) betrayed a corporate difficulty in

coming to terms with the prospect of war-fighting operations of this scale and

character. Of particular importance was the juxtaposing of the ROE and Targeting

Directives, which has probably never been more significant. The final ROE profile

was received in my Headquarters two hours before operations commenced.”

786.  AM Burridge wrote that the UK’s history over the last 12 years of “peacekeeping

in relatively benign environments” had reduced its ability to “exercise military judgment

guided only by the principles of LOAC”. That had “manifested itself at every level, not

only during the lengthy consideration of where targeting delegations should lie, but also

at the tactical level where complaints of over-regulation were followed by complaints

of insufficient guidance”.

787.  In the period leading up to operations, and even in the early stages of combat,

AM Burridge stated that the questions asked across all three environments revealed

that “the lack of further guidance was at first disconcerting”. That lesson was “quickly

and successfully learned, that responsibility should rest at the lowest level and

that military commanders respond well to the freedoms given to them despite the

attendant responsibilities”.

788.  Witnesses to the Inquiry emphasised the care which had been exercised

in establishing the legal framework for military operations and the authority

delegated to UK commanders.

270  Report Burridge to CJO, 8 May 2003, ‘NCC Operation Telic Hauldown Report: 07 Feb 03 – 08 May 03’.

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