The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
26.
Mr Alan
Goulty, FCO Director Middle East and North Africa, commented
to
Mr Straw’s
Private Secretary:
“So far so
good. But much will depend on how the US decide to pursue the
regime
change
option. It would be helpful if I and Mr Patey could be kept up to
speed on
discussions
with the US: hard to write contingency planning papers in ignorance
of
the
contingencies we are planning for.”10
27.
In a letter to
Mr Peter Westmacott, British Ambassador to Turkey, the following
day,
Mr Goulty
wrote:
“The
reality is that there is deep scepticism in the US that any UN
process can
deal
seriously with Iraq’s WMD … The Iraqis have shown little interest
in 1284/
suspension,
believing it to be a way of extending sanctions indefinitely. But
if we are
to offer an
alternative to military action, both we and the French are
convinced that
this will
need to involve a tough inspections regime based on strict
implementation
of existing
resolutions. Events since 11 September have increased the
chances
of
reuniting the Security Council around such a proposition. Faced
with a regime
threatening
alternative, and Security Council unity, there is a slight chance
Iraq
would allow
unconditional inspections. This would make it difficult for the
hawks in
Washington
to go ahead with military action. If the Iraqis persist in their
refusal then
the moral
and legal basis for action would be improved. Either way we are in
a better
“We
certainly need a clearer assessment of what the Americans are up
to. But it is
obvious
that there are some in Washington who would not accept yes for an
answer.
Disillusionment
with containment is widespread and the status quo is no longer
an
option.”
29.
Sir
Christopher Meyer, British Ambassador to the US, saw President
Bush’s
speech as a
warning to regimes he saw as “especially dangerous”, which
had
increased
expectations of military action against Iraq. The hawks in
Washington
felt that
they had won the argument about the need for military action. The
US
might want
to issue an ultimatum on inspections but set the bar so high that
Iraq
would never
comply.
30.
The US
might seek UK endorsement for its vision by early
March.
31.
Sir David
Manning was assured by Dr Rice that no decisions would be
taken
before the
planned meeting between Mr Blair and President Bush at Crawford
in
early
April.
10
Manuscript
comment Goulty to PS [FCS], 12 February 2002, on Minute Patey to
Goulty and PS [FCS],
12 February
2002, ‘Iraq: Next Steps’.
11 Letter
Goulty to Westmacott, 15 February 2002, ‘Iraq’.
392