6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
of a
perpetual discussion, interaction with various Iraqi opposition
groups and the
analysis of
the country set out in the various FCO papers.”179
309.
On 12
September, Sir David Manning commissioned advice from the FCO on
what
a
post-Saddam Hussein government might look like.180
310.
At his
request, Mr Blair received a pack of reading material on Iraq at
the
beginning
of August 2002, including on the extent of economic degradation in
Iraq
since 1991
and the complex interaction between tribal allegiance, ethnic
identity,
religious
affiliation and political persuasion.
311.
In late July,
Mr Blair asked his staff to assemble a pack of “summer
reading
312.
The material
supplied by the FCO, DIS and Mr Scarlett included the DIS papers
on
removing
Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s infrastructure, the role of the Ba’ath Party
and the role
of Iraq’s
tribes in internal security produced earlier in the
year.
313.
Mr Scarlett
sent Mr Blair an assessment of the cohesiveness of the Iraqi
regime,
in which
he stated:
“Conditions
inside Iraq are better now than they were immediately before the
start
of the
Oil-for-Food (OFF) programme in late 1996. OFF rations guarantee
that at
least basic
needs are met … The ‘winners’ under sanctions are those with a
hand in
sanctions-busting
trade … The greatest losers under sanctions have been
the middle
classes …
The poorer, rural communities in the south may have suffered
less.
The agricultural
economy may actually have benefited from the rise in prices
…”182
314.
Mr Scarlett
advised that the Kurds “would probably demand a reversal of
the
‘Arabisation’
of the north” after Saddam Hussein’s departure, leading to “a risk
of
inter‑ethnic
fighting and the expulsion of the Arab community from areas of the
north”.
315.
A JIC
Assessment of 5 August on the attitudes of regional states
to
military
action against Iraq stated that the US needed to convince them of
its
“determination
and ability to remove Saddam Hussein quickly”, and to
offer
“credible
plans for the aftermath”.
316.
The
Assessment also stated that, after a US attack began, “Iran
would
probably
boost its support for Shia groups working against
Saddam”.
179
Statement,
14 January 2011, pages 15-16.
180
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 12 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
181
Minute
Rycroft to Blair, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: background papers’; Minute
Scarlett to Powell,
1 August
2002, ‘Iraq: classified reading material’.
182
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 31 July 2002, ‘The Iraqi regime: risks and
threats’.
165