6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
458.
Maj Gen Fry
provided PJHQ advice on 25 July, including a paper entitled
‘Discrete
UK northern
options through Turkey’.196
That stated
that the US would not be able
logistically
to sustain simultaneous assaults from the north and south, and that
the
“northern
approach therefore remains a possibility for a self‑sustaining UK
force package
as part of
the overarching US campaign plan”.
459.
The paper
identified that the objective could be to either “defeat” or to
“fix” Iraqi
forces. The
basic UK package would be an armoured division with two
“square”
brigades.
460.
Maj Gen Fry
advised:
“… what is
beginning to emerge in the development of our work is the need for
a
possible
post‑conflict stabilisation force in order to meet the grand
strategic end
state of a
new acceptable government.”
461.
Maj Gen Fry
suggested that there would be a need for a three-star
headquarters,
including
to co‑ordinate air assets.
462.
The
development of thinking on force levels in a post‑Saddam Hussein
Iraq is
addressed
in Sections 6.4 and 6.5.
463.
Mr Bowen
sent Mr Hoon’s Private Office a fuller analysis of the options
for a UK
contribution
on 25 July.197
He advised
that:
•
Some
British contributions, such as making available Diego Garcia
and
the Cyprus
bases or employing air and maritime forces already engaged
in
operations
against Iraq, could be achieved quickly.
•
It would
take another couple of months to increase forces to medium
scale.
•
“To meet
probable US time‑scales” it would “not be possible to deploy a
fully
prepared,
fully sustainable armoured division for war‑fighting.” A fully
prepared
and
sustained armoured division (one which could fight a significant
Iraqi force)
would take
10 months.
•
Deployment
of an armoured division (minus) would only be possible
“within
six months
of a decision to deploy”, and would have “limited
sustainment
and reach”.
464.
The limited UK
capability available after six months, with no more than 10
days
ammunition
and limited reach, could not mount a deliberate attack on
large-scale Iraqi
forces. The
potential strategic advantage would be that the “actual deployment,
even
the
preparation, should have an impact on the Iraqi regime and prevent
single focus
attention
on the US forces in the South”. So long as it did not have to
engage in all‑out
196
Minute Fry
to MA/DCDS(C), 25 July 2002, ‘Developing Work on UK Options for
Operations
Against Iraq’.
197
Minute
Bowen to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 25 July 2002, ‘Iraq –
Potential UK Contribution’.
245