The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
86.
Reporting
informal consultations in New York on 10 March, Sir Jeremy
Greenstock
said that
he had drawn the attention of the Security Council to
Mr Straw’s statement and
the
reference to work on a list of defined tests.26
That had
“caused a fair bit of interest”.
87.
Sir Jeremy
also reported that, in response to questions, the points made
by
Dr Blix included:
•
40
interviews had been requested and 15 had been conducted
“to
UNMOVIC’s modalities”.
•
The RPV
UNMOVIC had discovered was important and should have
been
declared.
UNMOVIC was examining whether it was proscribed.
•
52 Al
Samoud 2 missiles had been destroyed.
•
It was
difficult for him to assess the regional threat posed by WMD. There
were
no
confirmed cases of its existence and UNMOVIC had never maintained
Iraq
had them.
But the clusters document recorded Iraqi deceit; repeated Full,
Final
and
Complete Disclosures (FFCDs); hide and seek and cheating in the
past.
There were
a lot of accounting problems.
•
UNMOVIC was
not expressing any low regard for intelligence agencies but
no
WMD had
been found as a result of tips on location. Part of the reason
might be
that
intelligence was gathered at levels which did not deal with actual
storage.
•
Experience
showed that it was possible that Iraq could have
mobile
biological facilities.
88.
Mr Blair
failed to secure unqualified support from President Lagos
for
his approach.
89.
Mr Blair
spoke twice to President Lagos on 10 March in an attempt to find a
path
both
President Lagos and President Fox could support.
90.
In the first
telephone call, before a conversation with Dr Blix,
Mr Blair reported
Dr Blix’s
response to Sir Jeremy Greenstock on the draft
tests.27
91.
In the second
conversation, Mr Blair reported progress on the three areas
President
Lagos had
raised:
•
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock had worked up an agreed text with UNMOVIC
identifying
a set of
concrete tests on which to judge Iraqi compliance.
•
Mr Blair
thought it “would be possible to find different wording” on the
ultimatum
to Iraq.
26
Telegram
403 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: 10 March
Council Consultations’.
27
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Chile, 10
March’.
416