Executive
Summary
was an ad
hoc alliance. The UK tried to establish some governance principles
in
the
Memorandum of Understanding proposed to the US, but did not press
the point.
This led
the UK into the uncomfortable and unsatisfactory situation of
accepting
shared
responsibility without the ability to make a formal input to the
process of
decision‑making.
862.
As Iraq
showed, the pattern set in the initial stage of an intervention is
crucial.
The maximum
impact needs to be made in the early weeks and months, or
opportunities
missed may
be lost for ever. It is very difficult to recover from a slow or
damaging start.
863.
Ground truth
is vital. Over‑optimistic assessments lead to bad decisions.
Senior
decision‑makers
– Ministers, Chiefs of Staff, senior officials – must have a flow
of
accurate
and frank reporting. A “can do” attitude is laudably ingrained in
the UK Armed
Forces – a
determination to get on with the job, however difficult the
circumstances –
but this
can prevent ground truth from reaching senior ears. At times in
Iraq, the bearers
of bad
tidings were not heard. On several occasions, decision‑makers
visiting Iraq
(including
the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Chief of the
General Staff)
found the
situation on the ground to be much worse than had been reported to
them.
Effective
audit mechanisms need to be used to counter optimism bias, whether
through
changes in
the culture of reporting, use of multiple channels of information –
internal
and external
– or use of visits.
864.
It is
important to retain a flexible margin of resources – in personnel,
equipment
and
financing – and the ability to change tactics to deal with adverse
developments
on the
ground. In Iraq, that flexibility was lost after the parallel
deployment to Helmand
province in
Afghanistan, which both constrained the supply of equipment (such
as
ISTAR) and
took away the option of an effective reinforcement. Any decision to
deploy
to the
limit of capabilities entails a high level of risk. In relation to
Iraq, the risks involved
in the
parallel deployment of two enduring medium scale operations were
not examined
with
sufficient rigour and challenge.
865.
The
management, in Whitehall, of a cross‑government effort on the scale
which
was
required in Iraq is a complex task. It needs dedicated leadership
by someone with
time,
energy and influence. It cannot realistically be done by a Prime
Minister alone, but
requires a
senior Minister with lead responsibility who has access to the
Prime Minister
and is
therefore able to call on his or her influence in resolving
problems or conflicts.
A coherent
inter‑departmental effort, supported by a structure able to hold
departments
to account,
is required to support such a Minister.
866.
The starting
point for all discussions of reconstruction in
circumstances
comparable
to those in Iraq between 2003 and 2009 must be that this is an area
where
progress
will be extremely difficult.
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