The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“… each of
us, as Secretary of the Cabinet, has been constantly conscious
of
his
responsibility to the Cabinet collectively and of the need to have
regard to the
needs and
responsibilities of the other members of the Cabinet (and indeed of
other
Ministers)
as well of those of the Prime Minister. That has coloured our
relationships
with Number
10 as well as those with other Ministers and their
departments.”198
432.
Lord Turnbull
told the Inquiry that Mr Blair:
“… wanted a
step change in the work on delivery and reform, which I hope
I
managed to
give him. Now … how does the Cabinet Secretary work? You
come
in and
you are – even with the two roles that you have, head of an
organisation
of half
a million civil servants and in some sense co-ordinating a public
sector
of about
five million people. You have to make choices as to where you make
your
effort, and
I think the policy I followed was not to take an issue over from
someone
to whom
it was delegated simply because it was big and important, but you
have
to make
a judgement as to whether it is being handled competently, whether
that
particular part
is, in a sense, under pressure, whether you think they are getting
it
wrong in some
sense, or they are missing certain important
things.”199
433.
The
responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary to ensure that members of
Cabinet are
fully
engaged in ways that allow them to accept collective responsibility
and to meet their
departmental
obligations nevertheless remains.
434.
In a
democratic system, public support and understanding for a major
military
operation
are essential. It is therefore important to guard against
overstating what
military
action might achieve and against any tendency to play down the
risks. A realistic
assessment
of the possibilities and limitations of armed force, and of the
challenges of
intervening
in the affairs of other States, should help any future UK
Government manage
expectations,
including its own.
435.
When the
potential for military action arises, the Government should not
commit to
a firm
political objective before it is clear that it can be achieved.
Regular reassessment
is
essential, to ensure that the assumptions upon which policy is
being made and
implemented
remain correct.
436.
Once an issue
becomes a matter for the Security Council, the UK
Government
cannot
expect to retain control of how it is to be discussed and
eventually decided
unless it
is able to work with the interests and agendas of other Member
States.
In relation
to Iraq, the independent role of the inspectors was a further
dimension.
198
Fourth
Report from the House of Lords Select Committee on the
Constitution, Session 2009-10,
The Cabinet
Office and the Centre of Government, HL Paper
30.
199
Public
hearing, 13 January 2010, page 3.
630