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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
“… each of us, as Secretary of the Cabinet, has been constantly conscious of
his responsibility to the Cabinet collectively and of the need to have regard to the
needs and responsibilities of the other members of the Cabinet (and indeed of other
Ministers) as well of those of the Prime Minister. That has coloured our relationships
with Number 10 as well as those with other Ministers and their departments.”198
432.  Lord Turnbull told the Inquiry that Mr Blair:
“… wanted a step change in the work on delivery and reform, which I hope I
managed to give him. Now … how does the Cabinet Secretary work? You come
in and you are – even with the two roles that you have, head of an organisation
of half a million civil servants and in some sense co-ordinating a public sector
of about five million people. You have to make choices as to where you make your
effort, and I think the policy I followed was not to take an issue over from someone
to whom it was delegated simply because it was big and important, but you have
to make a judgement as to whether it is being handled competently, whether that
particular part is, in a sense, under pressure, whether you think they are getting it
wrong in some sense, or they are missing certain important things.”199
433.  The responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary to ensure that members of Cabinet are
fully engaged in ways that allow them to accept collective responsibility and to meet their
departmental obligations nevertheless remains.
Lessons
434.  In a democratic system, public support and understanding for a major military
operation are essential. It is therefore important to guard against overstating what
military action might achieve and against any tendency to play down the risks. A realistic
assessment of the possibilities and limitations of armed force, and of the challenges of
intervening in the affairs of other States, should help any future UK Government manage
expectations, including its own.
435.  When the potential for military action arises, the Government should not commit to
a firm political objective before it is clear that it can be achieved. Regular reassessment
is essential, to ensure that the assumptions upon which policy is being made and
implemented remain correct.
436.  Once an issue becomes a matter for the Security Council, the UK Government
cannot expect to retain control of how it is to be discussed and eventually decided
unless it is able to work with the interests and agendas of other Member States.
In relation to Iraq, the independent role of the inspectors was a further dimension.
198 Fourth Report from the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Session 2009-10,
The Cabinet Office and the Centre of Government, HL Paper 30.
199 Public hearing, 13 January 2010, page 3.
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