The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
97.
The paper
described jihadists as “principally foreigners, but an increasing
number of
Iraqis”. It
recommended:
•
continuing
to demonstrate inclusivity in the drafting of the
Constitution,
committing
to the timetable set out in the TAL, and being prepared to
intervene
if necessary;
•
ensuring
that the system used in the December elections was a
province-based
rather than
a national-based one in order to maximise Sunni Arab
participation;
•
progressive
release of detainees and improved regimes in detention
facilities;
•
pressing
the ITG to relax the de-Ba’athification rules to allow disaffected
former
Army
officers and officials back into the ISF and government
institutions, and
ensuring
that de-Ba’athification decisions were based in a legal
framework
rather than
a political one;
•
reforming
the judicial system, including increasing the capability of the
Iraqi
Special
Tribunal and urging the appointment of a Human Rights
Minister;
•
redeploying
members of the Multi-National Force away from sensitive areas
and
making
clear there were no aspirations for long-term bases;
•
identifying
and brokering local cease-fires with those leaders in the
Sunni
community
who were capable of being brought into the political
process;
•
implementing
reconstruction projects rapidly following large-scale
counter‑insurgency
operations or local cease-fires.
98.
These were to
be accompanied by a strong media strategy, aimed at
undermining
the
jihadists’ “un-Islamic” message, and active engagement with
neighbouring states.
99.
DOP(I) agreed
the broad approach proposed by the FCO.49
100.
A few hours
after DOP(I) met on 21 July, the Defence and Overseas
Policy
Committee
(DOP) also met, chaired by Mr Blair.
101.
The MOD
invited DOP to consider whether or not it wished to move the
UK
Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) from the north of Afghanistan to
Helmand
province
and to decide what, if any, additional force package should be
deployed
102.
There was a
brief mention towards the end of the paper for DOP on the
possible
impact of
Iraq on the UK’s military operations in Afghanistan. It said that
plans for UK
military
drawdown in Iraq were under consideration and remained both highly
sensitive
in the
context of maintaining coalition cohesion and highly dependent on
ISF capability.
It was
anticipated that it would be possible to manage a significant
drawdown over the
next two
years.
49
Minutes, 21
July 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
50
Paper MOD
officials, 19 July 2005, ‘Afghanistan: Resources and Strategic
Planning’.
506