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3.3  |  Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002
Mr Blair’s interview on BBC Breakfast with Frost, 21 April 2002
25.  In an interview on BBC Breakfast with Frost on 21 April, primarily about the Budget,
Mr David Frost asked Mr Blair how close action was on Iraq.9 Mr Blair replied:
“We have not taken any decisions on Iraq at all … we have identified weapons of
mass destruction as a crucial issue … Saddam Hussein is a threat, the world would
be better off without Saddam Hussein in power, but … we will not take decision ’til
we have looked at all the options …”
26.  Mr Blair added that Saddam Hussein should allow the weapons inspectors to return.
That was what the United Nations had told him to do. Saddam Hussein was in breach
of UN resolutions and needed to fulfil those obligations.
27.  Asked whether there were differences between him and Mr Gordon Brown,
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr Blair said:
“… all we have decided … is that weapons of mass destruction have to be dealt with
… how we deal with it, however, is an open question.”
28.  Mr Blair’s comments on Iraq’s WMD capability and the timetable for the publication
of the “dossier” on those capabilities are set out in Section 4.1.
Resolution 1409 (2002)
29.  Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, was advised that there was little
prospect of agreement in the Security Council to any language demanding the
return of weapons inspectors.
30.  A resolution implementing the “smart sanctions” regime was agreed on
14 May, but compromises were necessary to secure Russian support and tougher
measures on tackling cross border smuggling were not included.
31.  Since the adoption of resolution 1382 in November 2001, the UK had continued
to pursue agreement on a new resolution introducing a smart sanctions regime.
32.  Following Mr Blair’s discussions with President Bush at Crawford, Mr Straw advised
Mr Blair on 9 April that the shift in focus to the re-admission of weapons inspectors drew
the UK “inexorably into the question of cover in international law” for military action in the
event that, as Mr Straw suspected, Iraq failed to comply (see Section 3.2).10
33.  Mr Charles Gray, Head of the FCO Middle East Department, wrote that Mr Straw
asked for advice on:
what, assuming a resolution authorising military action against Iraq is
unachievable, we might hope to get in the Security Council to sustain the
9  BBC News, 21 April 2002, BBC Breakfast with Frost Interview: Prime Minister Tony Blair.
10  Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 9 April 2002, ‘Your Commons Statement’.
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