3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
•
Warned
Mr de Villepin not to make an issue of the “material breach”
language
in OP1.
That was “a matter of historical fact and, with the new OP10, no
longer
permitted
the one stage approach France had feared”.
•
Told
Mr de Villepin that the French position was “a matter of trust
for the UK as
well as the
US. Villepin’s reassurances about France’s willingness to
support
and
participate in military action if justified had empowered Powell to
get the
changes
made in OP10. If France tried to get ‘material breach’ language out
of
OP1, those
in the [US] Administration who opposed the UN route would
argue
that France
could not be trusted on a second SCR.”
591.
Mr de
Villepin was reported to have responded “somewhat half‑heartedly”
that
“others in
the Council opposed ‘material breach’ language … and that the SCR
should
focus on
the need for inspections rather than looking back”. He had not
suggested it was
a French
“red line”.
592.
Mr Straw
concluded that, if President Chirac “were willing to sign up to the
new
OP10
language, he would have more negotiating room … should he want to
reach
a private
agreement on how to move forward”.
593.
In a statement
for the Inquiry, Sir Michael Wood wrote:
“Early the
next morning (17 October) the Foreign Secretary ran through the
new
OP10 with
the French Foreign Minister, saying in this context that the US
could not
accept any
language requiring a further Security Council resolution but that
they
accepted
that a further meeting implied a second SCR whether moved by
them
or other
members of the Council.”190
594.
Mr Blair
discussed the latest developments on the UN negotiations and
the
military
options with Mr Straw, Mr Hoon and Adm Boyce on 17
October.191
Mr Powell,
Mr Campbell,
Baroness Morgan, Sir David Manning and Mr Rycroft were also
present.
595.
Mr Blair
continued to take the position that a further resolution
explicitly
authorising
military action would not be needed in all
circumstances.
596.
Mr Blair,
Mr Straw and Mr Hoon concluded on 17 October that the
only way
to keep the
US on the UN route was if there was a clear understanding that, in
the
event of a
reported breach of the new UN resolution, action would be taken
even
if a
second resolution could not be agreed.
190
Statement,
15 March 2011, page 8.
191
Letter
Rycroft to Sedwill, 17 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UN Route’.
307