The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• The Coalition’s communications strategy had to be put on a more energetic

footing.

• The CPA needed greater administrative capacity. Mr Blair proposed a small

US/UK team “with one of our people from our own circle” to act as a rapid

conduit to President Bush and himself, enabling them to clear the bureaucratic

obstacles immediately.

417.  Mr Blair concluded his Note by stating that he would be “going back to almost

a war footing” in order to ensure focus on issues in Iraq.

418.  Mr Blair and President Bush discussed Iraq over breakfast on 2 June.237 Mr Blair

emphasised the “huge scale” of the reconstruction task. Saddam Hussein had left an

“appalling” legacy and reduced a potentially rich country to third world levels of poverty.

Ambassador Bremer was being asked to take on “a shattered country with decrepit

infrastructure and a population that had developed a dependency culture”. That was

“a very tall order”. He should be given whatever he wanted for capacity building.

419.  Mr Blair also argued that a clear political vision and timetable was needed, together

with a media strategy to avoid “a dangerous information vacuum”.

420.  On 3 June, Mr Blair chaired a meeting on Iraq attended by Mr Hoon, Baroness

Amos, Sir Michael Jay (in Mr Straw’s absence) and No.10 officials.238 Mr Blair said that

he had returned from Iraq convinced that “an enormous amount needed to be done”.

He told the meeting:

• The CPA lacked grip and organisation, rather than money or staff.

• The UK should “beef up” its involvement in the CPA.

• There should be a White House/No.10 team to work alongside Mr Sawers and

Ambassador Bremer.

• There should be a strong civilian team in the South.

• The CPA and US decision-making processes were too slow. Contracts needed

to be processed faster.

• British companies needed to be energised to take up opportunities in Iraq.

421.  Mr Blair also said that he believed that Whitehall should go back to “a war footing”

for the next two to three months to avoid “losing the peace in Iraq”.

422.  Following the meeting, Mr Cannon commissioned a number of papers to be

ready before a further meeting on 6 June. Those included a list of 10 to 15 outstanding,

practical issues for Mr Blair to raise with President Bush that would “make a big

237  Letter Manning to McDonald, 2 June 2003, ‘Breakfast Meeting Between The Prime Minister and

President Bush: 2 June 2003’.

238  Letter Cannon to McDonald, 3 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting, 3 June’.

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