The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
aim for a
political outcome to emerge from within Iraq, but with the
international
community
perhaps needing to host a conference to help reach a decision
on
Iraq’s
future government; and
•
recognise
the likely need for a plan for an interim administration and
an
international
security force.
541.
The AHGI
concluded that the FCO paper on scenarios for Iraq after
Saddam
Hussein
needed to be more ambitious.
542.
Mr Jonathan
Powell described it as “fairly useless”. He advocated
a
UN
administration in waiting followed by “some sort of democratic
choice”
and
highlighted the importance of finding a way to stop the “terrible
bloodletting
of
revenge”.
543.
Early
indications from Washington suggested that the US favoured a
post-
conflict
military governorate followed by a civilian administration before
the
transfer of
authority to an Iraqi government.
544.
There was
no apparent role for the UN in the US approach.
545.
Sir David
Manning commissioned further advice from the FCO on
possible
models for
a post-Saddam Hussein administration, including on where the
UN
would fit
in.
546.
When the AHGI
discussed the FCO paper on scenarios for a post-Saddam
Hussein
Iraq on 27
September, it concluded that something more ambitious was
required.291
Six areas
needed expanding:
•
the
duration of any international involvement in Iraq;
•
the
sustainability of UK forces there;
•
the shape
of Iraqi governance;
•
SSR;
•
economic
recovery; and
•
the
humanitarian response.
547.
The AHGI
observed that US officials would not be available to discuss the
paper
until late
October, but should be sent a copy well in advance.
548.
Mr Powell
commented to Sir David Manning:
“I think
this is fairly useless. We need a UN Administration in waiting with
some
exiled
Iraqi technocrats supported by an international military force.
Then we need to
come to
some sort of democratic choice for the Iraqi people – a convention
(or Loya
Jirga!).
The key things are to start identifying an Iraqi Karzai and to come
up with a
291
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 30 September 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
204