The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

138.  Mr Asquith also described increasing tension at the heart of the Shia community

over the question of federalism:

“The Sadrist trend is split, with Muqtada’s supporters siding with the Sunni

anti‑federalist tendency; the Shia federalists in the South-East don’t know what they

want (decentralisation or federalism) …”

139.  On 22 August, the IPU alerted Mr Straw’s Private Secretary to the risk that the Shia

and Kurdish representatives might reach agreement on the linked issues of federalism

and control of natural resources which did not have Sunni buy-in.66 The IPU proposed a

joint US/UK demarche67 on Shia and Kurdish leaders, to be agreed between Mr Straw

and Dr Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State.

140.  Mr Straw’s Private Secretary reported the conversation between Mr Straw and

Secretary Rice later that evening.68

141.  During the discussion, Mr Straw had expressed concern over reports that the

Shia and Kurds might “stitch up” a deal on federalism at the expense of the Sunnis.

That, Mr Straw feared, would be destabilising. In his view any solution which involved

merging provinces should be approved by the TNA. Secretary Rice said that she would

speak to the US Ambassador to Iraq and then call back.

142.  Mr Straw and Dr Rice again discussed progress on constitutional negotiations on

24 August.69 Secretary Rice reported that agreement appeared close.

143.  On federalism, the Shia were prepared to commit to take no steps towards forming

newly federated regions for four years, on the basis of a firm assurance from the US that

it would not oppose any measures to form a federation after that period, and that

it would give due consideration to the needs of the South in providing financial

assistance packages.

144.  Secretary Rice added that “there appeared to be a latent suspicion that the UK

would repeat the history of the 1920s and undercut agreements reached with the Iraqis”,

and therefore suggested that the UK might also offer these firm assurances. Mr Straw

discussed this point with Mr Blair, and agreed to sign up to these commitments. He

commented that “we could not in any case prevent the Iraqis from forming federated

regions and we actually channelled most of our aid to the South already”.

145.  The ISG reviewed progress on the Constitution on 26 August.70 It considered that

although a deal seemed likely, the level of Sunni support for it was in serious doubt and

66  Email IPU [junior official] to Siddiq, 22 August 2005, ‘Proposed FS call on Rice’.

67  A formal diplomatic expression of displeasure.

68  Email Siddiq to Asquith, 22 August 2005, ‘Iraq: FS Rice 21 Aug 2004 [sic]’.

69  Minute Siddiq to Sawers, 24 August 2005, ‘The Foreign Secretary’s Conversation with the US Secretary

of State, 24 August’.

70  Letter Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 31 August 2005, ‘Iraq Strategy Group’.

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