The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
5.
Section 6.5
concludes that Ministers, officials and the military continued to
assume
that the US
could act as guarantor of the UK’s objectives, including its
reconstruction
objectives,
in Iraq.
6.
The Government
had established the inter‑departmental (FCO/MOD/DFID)
Iraq
Planning
Unit (IPU) on 10 February 2003 to provide “policy guidance on the
practical
questions”
that UK civilian officials and military commanders would face in a
post‑conflict
Iraq.1
The head of
the IPU was a senior member of the Diplomatic Service, who
reported
to the FCO
Director Middle East and North Africa.
7.
The creation
of the Ad Hoc Group on Iraq (see Section 6.4) in September
2002
and the IPU
improved co‑ordination across government at official level, but
neither
body
carried sufficient authority to establish a unified planning
process across the
four
principal departments involved – the FCO, the MOD, DFID and the
Treasury –
or between
military and civilian planners.
8.
Crucially,
with the IPU focused on policy, there remained no department or
unit with
responsibility
for delivering the UK’s contribution to the reconstruction
effort.
9.
After the
invasion force had rapidly brought down Saddam Hussein’s regime,
the
UK’s
six‑year engagement in Iraq fell into three broad phases, which the
Inquiry has
used to
provide a simplified framework for describing events:
•
Occupation
– March 2003 to June 2004: during
which the UK was formally a
joint
Occupying Power alongside the US, and Iraq was governed by the
US‑led
Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA);
•
Transition
– June 2004 to the end of 2005: characterised
by the increasing
power of
Iraqi politicians and institutions, and ending with elections and
the
formation
of the Prime Minister Nuri al‑Maliki’s government; and
•
Preparations
for withdrawal – 2006 to 2009: during
which period the UK
sought to
transfer its remaining responsibilities in Multi‑National
Division
(South‑East)
(MND(SE)) to Iraqi forces so that it could withdraw its
remaining
troops.
10.
Shortly after
the beginning of military operations in Iraq, officials advised
that
the
humanitarian assistance capabilities available in Iraq would be
inadequate in
the
event of a protracted conflict, significant damage to
infrastructure or large‑scale
movements
of people. The use of chemical and biological weapons could also
trigger
a humanitarian
disaster.
1
Letter Jay
to Turnbull, 17 February 2003, ‘Iraq Planning Unit’ attaching
Paper, [undated], ‘Proposed
Terms of
Reference for the tract [sic] Planning Unit’.
530