The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
209.
During their
conversation, Mr Blair described to Mr Annan a three stage
process
for
post-conflict Iraq. First, ORHA would stabilise Iraq and start work
on the basic
infrastructure.
Second, the Iraqi-run IIA should progressively assume
responsibility from
ORHA.
Third, after a constitutional process and elections, a full Iraqi
Government would
be set
up.
210.
Mr Blair was
clear that the UK wanted the UN to be part of the process at
each
stage, and
that each stage should progress as quickly as possible to the next.
There
was
discussion of the need for a strategic vision, including of the
role for a UN Special
Representative,
and a future UN role. Mr Annan was explicit that he was not arguing
for
a UN
lead.
211.
Mr Blair
sought Mr Annan’s advice on future process within the UN
and
was advised
that the Security Council accepted that initially the Coalition
would be in
charge.
Thereafter, a resolution (or a series of smaller resolutions) would
be necessary
to define
the UN’s role in the political process and in reconstruction. This
required
careful
handling.
212.
Commenting on
the discussion, Mr Rycroft wrote: “In our view it should
be
possible,
now that Bush has accepted that the UN should have a vital role,
for the
UN system
to start to become involved on the ground in a way that helps to
define
its future
role.”
213.
By 16 April,
the UK had produced a draft MOU and sent it to the US and
Australia
for
comment. Ms Adams showed a copy to Lord Goldsmith, observing that
it could be
made more
effective by establishing precisely how consultation would
work.105
She
also
reported
“indications that the US may be getting cold feet”, based on
concern that if it
reached the
public domain the MOU may be seen as “carving up Iraq in a colonial
way”.
214.
Reporting
discussion at the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 17 April, Ms Short
told
DFID
officials that Mr Blair had directed that “if ORHA was going to be
big, we should
215.
Minutes of the
meeting record that Mr Blair asked for quick action on
the
UK’s
contribution, insisting “there should be no bureaucratic hold up in
sorting out
216.
Mr Rycroft
wrote to Mr McDonald on 17 April to convey Mr Blair’s strong
agreement
to
proposals for increased support for ORHA.108
Mr Blair
felt that “as a general rule, our
role in
humanitarian aid and in the reconstruction of Iraq should be
commensurate with
our
contribution to the military phase”. That was to include “British
officials … present
105
Minute
Adams to Attorney General, 16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Draft
MoU’.
106
Minute PPS
[DFID] to Miller, 17 April 2003, ‘Iraq Cabinet Readout: 17
April’.
107
Minutes, 17
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
108
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 17 April 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA’.
164