3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
702.
In his report
to the Security Council on 27 January, Dr Blix rehearsed
the
disarmament
process since 1991 and identified three “important questions” for
the
Security
Council:
•
“[H]ow much
[prohibited material and activity] might remain undeclared
and
intact from
before 1991”?
•
“[W]hat, if
anything, was illegally produced or procured after 1998, when
the
inspectors
left”?
•
How to
prevent “any weapons of mass destruction be[ing] produced or
procured
703.
Dr Blix
reported on UNMOVIC’s activities and gave an assessment of the
extent
of Iraq’s
co‑operation with those activities, including its declaration of 7
December 2002.
704.
Dr Blix
stated that UNMOVIC shared “the sense of urgency felt by the
[Security]
Council to
use inspection as a path to attain, within a reasonable time
verifiable
disarmament
of Iraq”. UNMOVIC’s capability was “growing”. It had 260 staff
members
of whom 100
were inspectors. It had conducted about 300 inspections at more
than
230 sites,
of which 20 were sites which had not been inspected before. A
training
programme
in Vienna would create a pool of 350 qualified experts from which
inspectors
could be
drawn.
705.
Dr Blix
reported: “It would appear from our experience so far that Iraq has
decided
in
principle to provide co‑operation on process, namely access.” Iraq
had “on the whole
co‑operated
rather well so far … access has been provided to all sites that we
wanted
to inspect
and with one exception it has been prompt”. There had, however,
been “some
problems”
in two areas: Iraq’s refusal to guarantee the safety of U2 flights
to provide
aerial
imagery and for surveillance during inspections; and helicopter
operations,
although
that had been “solved”. There had also been “some recent disturbing
incidents
and
harassment”.
706.
Dr Blix
stated that an Iraqi decision to provide co‑operation on substance
was
“indispensible”
to bring “the disarmament task to completion”. OP9 of resolution
1441
required
Iraqi co‑operation to be “active”. It was “not enough to open
doors”. Inspection
was “not a
game of ‘catch as catch can’. Rather … it is a process of
verification for the
purpose of
creating confidence.”
707.
Dr Blix
reported: “In the fields of missiles and biotechnology, Iraq’s
declaration
contains a
good deal of new material and information covering the period from
1998
and onward.
This is welcome.”
243
UN Press
Release, 27 January 2003, Security
Council briefed by Chief UN Weapons Experts on First
60 days of
Inspections in Iraq (SC/7644).
125