The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

369. Mr Pruce commented on 10 September that he thought the dossier should focus

on Saddam Hussein as much as possible and use personal witness statements about

Saddam’s abuses and quotations from Saddam’s speeches. He added:

“In the public’s mind the key difference between this text and the IISS text will be the

access to intelligence material I like the idea of a history of JIC Assessments Might

we also include a general statement on the nature of the intelligence services and

their role …”174

370. On 11 September, Mr Pruce wrote:

“Who will issue the text? Us? The Cabinet Office? Why don’t we issue it in the name

of the JIC? Makes it more interesting to the media.”175

371. Mr Pruce suggested that:

• The draft should be personalised onto Saddam “as much as possible”.

• The aim should be to “convey the impression that … over the past decade he

[Saddam Hussein] has been aggressively and relentlessly pursuing WMD while

brutally repressing his own people”.

• Wherever there was a reference to weapons, there should be a description

of their destructive capacity.

372. Mr Pruce commented that the section on intelligence would be:

“… the one that readers will go to first. This draft already plays up the nature of

intelligence sourcing. I think we could play this up more The more we advertise that

unsupported assertions (eg Saddam attaches great importance to the possession

of WMD) come from intelligence the better The history of JIC Assessments will

help too …”

373. Mr Pruce’s comments on the Foreword are set out later in this Section.

374. Mr Philip Bassett, a Special Adviser in No.10, commented:

“Very long way to go I think … we’re in a lot of trouble with this as it stands now”.176

375. Mr Tom Kelly, the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman, wrote that the draft had

“one central weakness”, it did “not differentiate enough between capacity and intent”:

“We know he is trying to get WMD – and this shows those attempts are intensifying

But can we show why we think he intends to use them aggressively, rather than in

self-defence We need that to counter the argument that Saddam is bad, but not mad

174 Email Pruce to Mathews, 10 September 2002, ‘Dossier’.

175 Email Pruce to Campbell, 11 September 2002, ‘Draft Dossier (J Scarlett Version of 10 Sept)’.

176 Email Bassett to Pruce and Campbell, 11 September 2002, ‘Draft Dossier (J Scarlett Version

of 10 Sept)’.

184