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6.2  |  Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003
282.  Similarly, if Mr Hoon had received a handwritten document of the nature
described by Sir Kevin, the Inquiry considers it is more likely than not that he would
have remembered it, even after a number of years. The Inquiry therefore accepts that
Mr Hoon did not receive it.
283.  There is no evidence that Sir Kevin spoke about the need for a collective
discussion with Sir Andrew Turnbull or with other Permanent Secretary
colleagues.
284.  Regardless of whether or not Mr Hoon was provided with specific advice
about the need for a collective discussion, it should have been clear to him from
the advice he did receive, which is set out in this Section and Section 6.1, that
a significant change of direction was proposed and that there were major issues
to be addressed.
285.  Sir Kevin Tebbit would have been right to advise in January that Ministers
should have paused for a full discussion of the policy on Iraq, the risks of success
and failure, the advantages and disadvantages of different options, and the
implications of the decisions taken.
286.  As Section 7 sets out, decisions of this importance, which raise a number
of challenging questions, are best addressed by a Cabinet Committee on the basis
of considered inter-departmental advice.
287.  Such a collective discussion should then have been reported to Cabinet
before the deployment was announced.
288.  As Section 9.4 shows, Cabinet did discuss the decision to deploy to Helmand
in May 2006, in January of that year.
289.  The absence of planning and preparations for the UK role after the conflict
is addressed in Section 6.5.
Planning military operations
Military discussions with the US
290.  In mid-January, Lt Gen Reith and Gen Franks discussed the role UK forces
might play in combat operations.
291.  Gen Franks wrote in his memoir that in January, only a small group of senior
CENTCOM officers knew “significant aspects of the evolving concept” and only four
people had the “full picture”.100
292.  On 17 January, Major General David Wilson, Senior British Military Adviser at
CENTCOM, reported to Lt Gen Reith on a conference chaired by Gen Franks for
100  Franks T. & McConnell M. American Soldier. HarperCollins, 2004.
427
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