10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
263.
Introducing
the paper at the AHMGIR, an FCO official said that Iraq’s
oil
infrastructure
was in a better state than had been feared when the conflict
began.135
The UK was
clear that the OFF programme was the only legal means for exporting
Iraqi
oil,
“though some in the US wanted to find ways around this”. The UK’s
strategy was to
extend the
OFF programme, then transfer control of oil revenues to the IIA
“with some
international
oversight”, and then transfer full control to a democratically
elected Iraqi
Government.
264.
Ms Hewitt said
that UK companies wanted a future Iraqi Government to
establish
a “level
playing field” for oil industry contracts.
265.
The AHMGIR
agreed that the UK should:
•
encourage
Iraqi oil exports to recommence as soon as possible, but only
after
an
appropriate resolution had been adopted;
•
offer UK
oil expertise to ORHA and in the medium term to the IIA;
and
•
leave
future decisions on the shape of the Iraqi oil industry and the
management
of oil
revenues to the new Iraqi Government, while advising on
international best
practice.
266.
Mr John
Bellinger, NSC, sent a US draft of a post-conflict resolution to
Sir David
Manning on
28 April.136
It provided
for:
•
the
creation of an Iraqi Development Fund, which would be audited
by
independent
accountants and whose operations would be “monitored” by
the
UN Special
Co-ordinator;
•
funds in
the Iraqi Development Fund to be disbursed “at the direction of
the
Coalition
Provisional Authority”;
•
the
resumption of oil sales at the market price; and
•
the
transfer of unspent OFF programme funds and oil revenues into the
Iraqi
Development
Fund.
267.
Section 9.1
describes negotiations between the UK and US on the draft
resolution,
which
increasingly focused on the mandate of the UN Special Co-ordinator
and the
extension
of the OFF programme.
268.
Mr Straw,
Sir David Manning, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK
Permanent
Representative
to the UN, and FCO officials discussed the draft by video link
with
Secretary
Powell and Dr Rice and US officials on 30
April.137
135
Minutes, 24
April 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
136
Letter
Bellinger to Manning, 28 April 2003, [untitled], attaching Paper,
[undated], ‘Resolution
on Post‑Conflict
Iraq’.
137
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 30 April 2003, ‘Iraq/UN: Video-Conference with
Condi Rice and
Colin
Powell, 30 April’.
413