The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
56.
The JIC
considered that the Kurds and Shia “would not show their hand until
US
resolve to
overthrow Saddam” was “absolutely clear”. There was “no obvious
leader”
among those
groups who was “capable of unifying the opposition” and had
“credibility and
popular
appeal inside Iraq”. No likely replacement for Saddam Hussein from
within the
regime had
been identified, but the JIC stated that, in the event of internal
change, it was
“likely
that any successor would be autocratic and drawn from the Sunni
military elite”.
57.
The MOD
advised Mr Hoon that the UK should not rule out military
action
against
Iraq; and that it should think through the options in more depth to
improve
the
“prospects for influencing the US towards a successful
outcome”.
58.
Mr Simon
Webb, MOD Policy Director, sent Mr Hoon advice on 27 February
on
how the
UK might approach the three countries referred to by President Bush
as an
59.
Mr Webb
recommended that the UK should acknowledge that the countries
posed
“increasing”
risks to international stability; and that the US should be
persuaded to
explain
why. The UK should:
“Encourage
a broad‑based approach ranging from diplomacy to
challenge
inspections
and levers on suppliers.
“Not rule
out UK participation in military action against Iraq […] if that is
the only way
to stem the
tide of WMD proliferation and a worthwhile and legal option exists
at
the time.”
60.
Mr Webb
also stated that it was important to distinguish between two
strands: the
“direct
risks from proliferation” and the “potential association with
international terrorism”.
61.
In the context
of the response from European partners, Mr Webb
advised:
“… it would
be wiser for the UK to take a more complex position supporting
the
underlying
concerns but advocating a greater mix of possible approaches.
No.10
have
started to take this line over the last week but we need to think
through the
options in
more depth. In this way we have better prospects of influencing the
US
towards a
successful outcome. Above all we should encourage the US to
explain
the issues
more effectively …”
62.
Mr Webb’s
detailed advice on the risks from Iraq’s WMD is addressed
in
Section 4.1.
27
Minute Webb
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 27 February 2002, ‘Axis of
Evil’.
184