14.2 |
Conclusions: Military equipment (post‑conflict)
66.
The
availability of support helicopters in MND(SE) was constantly
stretched because
of two
factors.
67.
The first was
that support helicopters were used to supplement other
shortfalls.
Support
helicopters were needed to move personnel by air when circumstances
were
too
dangerous for ground transport. However, the same helicopters were
also required
for
surveillance in the absence of sufficient ISTAR
capability.
68.
That meant
that commanders were faced with a conflict between two
requirements,
and the
need to compromise effectiveness.
69.
As General Sir
Richard Dannatt, Commander in Chief Land Command,
wrote,
there is an
“inextricable” link between ISTAR, protected mobility and
helicopters:
“When the
two former capabilities are under stress … we invariably place a
higher
70.
The second
factor was Afghanistan. Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, Chief
of
the Air
Staff, anticipated in February 2004 that support helicopters would
be “seriously
stretched”29
by
increased involvement in Afghanistan. His prediction was borne
out.
71.
Reports from
Iraq in the second half of 2005 stressed the need for more
helicopters.
General Sir
Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, stated in October that
the fleet was
“creaking
badly”.30
In
December, Major General James Dutton, GOC MND(SE)
between
June 2005
and December 2005, wrote that “the simple fact is that we need
more
helicopters
(and aircrew) urgently”.31
72.
The DOC wrote
in April 2006 that capacity had “become parlous at times
during
2005”.32
It added
that the Joint Helicopter Force (Iraq) had “struggled to meet its
tasks
even with
rigorous prioritisation” and the UK’s battlefield helicopter force
“was stretched
to meet the
requirement of the current operation”.
73.
In June 2006,
Lt Gen Houghton stated that there was an endorsed
requirement
to increase
helicopter provision for Afghanistan but not for Iraq. He
acknowledged
that
operations had at times been constrained by a lack of helicopter
support.
Lt Gen Houghton
concluded:
“With no
reductions on the horizon in Op TELIC and escalating
requirements
in
Op HERRICK [Afghanistan], our national aviation requirements
now need
28
Letter
Dannatt to Jackson, July 2006, ‘The Level of Operational Risk on
Current Operations’.
29
Minute CAS
to PSO/CDS, 6 February 2004, ‘Operational Tempo’.
30
Report CGS
to CDS, 18 October 2005, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq: 10‑13 Oct
05’.
31
Report
Dutton to CJO, 12 December 2005, ‘June to December 2005 – Hauldown
Report’.
32
Report DOC,
4 April 2006, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume
3’.
239