9.3 | July 2004 to May 2005

326. Three days after the start of the operation in Fallujah, on 11 November, Mr Straw

told Cabinet that it was going “slightly better than had been anticipated”.174

327. Although there had been civilian casualties, Prime Minister Allawi had gone to

great lengths to pursue a political solution. Mr Straw considered that it was necessary

to “deal with Fallujah” if elections were to be held.

328. In a telephone conversation with Mr Straw on the same day, Secretary Powell said

that operations in Fallujah were going “relatively well” although Mosul, where the police

structure had entirely broken down, was a concern.175 Mr Straw commented that Mosul

“had the potential not only to be a centre of insurgency, but also of ethnic civil war”.

329. On 11 November the JIC issued an Assessment covering current themes relating

to the security situation in Iraq.176

330. The JIC judged that insurgent violence would continue at a high level in Iraq over

the next few months, however effective the operation in Fallujah was. It judged there

to be evidence of local co-operation between insurgent groups, but no overall

co‑ordination.

331. In Fallujah, US and Iraqi forces were making “good progress” and:

“A large number of insurgents have left the city, although the risk of significant attack

remains. Insurgents outside Fallujah will continue responding to the offensive with

an increased effort, including in the UK area of responsibility in North Babil.”

332. It was the JIC’s view that:

“There are still too few capable Iraqi forces to cope with the widespread security

problems. Attacks and intimidation by insurgent groups against the Iraqi security

forces are undermining their effectiveness, in some cases. All Iraqi official

institutions, including the security forces, employ individuals who give information

to insurgents, either willingly or under threat.”

333. The JIC judged that the new relationship between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and

Al Qaida had had “no immediate impact on the security situation in Iraq” and was

“unlikely to alter it in the short term”. There were, however, indications that other

AQ operatives were sending trainers to Iraq.

334. Mr Blair visited Washington from 11 to 12 November to “look ahead strategically

with President Bush to the key issues of his second term”.177

174 Cabinet Conclusions, 11 November 2004.

175 Letter Owen to Sheinwald, 11 November 2004, ‘Conversation with US Secretary of State,

11 November 2004’.

176 JIC Assessment, 11 November 2004, ‘Iraq Security – Current Concerns’.

177 Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 5 November 2004, ‘Visit to Washington’.

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