The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
676.
It is not
clear whether that advice was seen by Ms Short.
677.
On 28
February, the MOD warned No.10 that the UK was “currently at
risk
of taking
on a very substantial commitment that we will have great difficulty
in
sustaining
beyond the immediate conclusion of conflict”. Specific
concerns
included:
•
the extent
of practical US support for UK humanitarian
assistance;
•
the absence
of an ORHA plan for administering Iraq;
•
the US
expectation that the UK would take on an unsustainable
commitment
in the South-East;
•
US
decision-making moving so fast that, even though the UK was trying
to
influence
US thinking, “UK policy will have largely to be about
managing
the
consequences of US decisions that are taken for us”;
•
the risk
that the UK, as an Occupying Power, might be expected to
make
up a
significant part of any funding shortfall for
reconstruction.
678.
Lt Gen
Garner was reported to be attracted to the idea of abandoning
the
plan to
have three ORHA sectors in Iraq in favour of mirroring the seven
proposed
military
sectors.
679.
On 28
February, Mr Hoon’s Private Office sent Sir David Manning an
update
on military
planning.300
The paper
was also sent to the Private Offices of Mr Straw
and
Mr Brown,
and to Mr Bowen, but not to DFID.
680.
Much of the
section on post-conflict planning was devoted to US
preparations.
The paper
stated:
“For the
immediate aftermath, most of the planning is now considered to
be
complete,
but there remains significant effort required to agree how those
plans
should be
implemented. There are significant outstanding policy issues
which
require
resolution before the beginning of operations. For the later stages
of the
aftermath,
planning is also gathering speed (meaning that important policy
decisions
are being
made now by the US that will dictate the course of the
aftermath).”
681.
The paper
stated that CFLCC and ORHA were taking forward planning, but
that
there were
“important issues of dispute between them”. The UK was “very
heavily
engaged in
military (CFLCC) planning at a senior level”, with (acting) Maj Gen
Whitley
as Deputy
Commanding General (Post Hostilities), and had “good visibility” of
ORHA
thinking
thanks to the embedded UK staff.
682.
The paper
stated that orders for the initial aftermath would issue shortly,
setting out
the
responsibilities of an Occupying Power. There was also a
“superficially impressive”
300
Letter
Williams to Manning, 28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning and
Preparation’ attaching
Paper [unattributed],
28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning Update – 28 February
2003’.
432