9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
314.
Sir John
Scarlett told the Inquiry that withdrawing from Basra Palace
–
“a major
exposed operation” – without a single casualty had been a “really
important
315.
Colonel Peter
Mansoor, executive officer to Gen Petraeus in 2007, wrote in
his
book
Surge:
“By
withdrawing their forces from Basra and consolidating them on a
single base at
the city
outskirts, British political and military leaders had abdicated
responsibility for
the city’s
security. Shi’a militia leaders had contested control of the city
and outlasted
the British
will to continue the fight.”147
316.
Mr Dowse
told the Inquiry that, although there was a policy statement to the
effect
that even
after withdrawal from Basra Palace UK forces retained the ability
to re-engage
if
required, his view and that of the intelligence community more
generally had been that
that was
not true “in any meaningful sense”:
“The idea
that we could have gone back into Basra and reoccupied in the
event
of a crisis
… was extremely optimistic, to say the least. We never actually
were
in a
position where we wrote that in an assessment. I recall going to a
couple of
meetings
where I asked the MOD representatives how confident they were of
the
assertion
of re-engagement and was told … ‘We recognise we are carrying a
risk.’
Actually,
it was never really tested.”148
317.
Asked whether
the UK had the capacity to re-intervene if the agreement with
JAM
in Basra
had broken down, Maj Gen Binns told the Inquiry that he “didn’t
really define
what
‘re-intervention’ meant, because it implies that we were
intervening in the first place
in 2007 and
we weren’t”. Maj Gen Binns added:
“Did I have
the capacity to go back and reoccupy the Palace? Yes, at a stretch,
but it
never
really crossed my mind because I was so glad to get out of
it.”149
Maj Gen
Shaw told the Inquiry that he thought it likely that without the
cease-fire,
withdrawing
from Basra Palace might have become “the totemic humiliation of the
British
forces shot
out of Basra”.150
Maj Gen
Shaw subsequently added the following detail: “Indeed,
subsequent
conversations
with [officials working closely with the military] relate JAM
affirmation after
146
Private
hearing, 10 June 2010, pages 41-42.
147
Mansoor
PR. Surge: My
Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq
War.
Yale University
Press, 2013.
148
Private
hearing, 14 June 2010, pages 77-78.
149
Private
hearing, 2 June 2010, page 30.
150
Private
hearing, 21 June 2010, page 37.
241