1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
623.
Mr Campbell
recorded in his diary a conversation with Mr Blair on the
morning
of 15 November,
in which he said that “the US were still talking about going in
today.
This was a
nightmare, he said.”
624.
In a statement
to the House of Commons on 16 November, Mr Blair
explained
why the UK
Government had been prepared to take military action, why it had
stayed
its hand
and why it remained “ready to strike” if Iraq failed to comply
fully with its
625.
Mr Blair
stated that Iraq had “built up a vast arsenal of weapons of
mass
destruction”
before the Gulf Conflict and that, since then, he had “been trying
to hide
them, and
to acquire more”. After the agreement of the MOU in February 1998,
Iraq
had
“resumed superficial co-operation”, but that changed on
5 August. The issue was
not
“technical breaches of UN resolutions, but … a pattern of
behaviour” that continued
“to pose
actual huge risks”.
626.
Mr Blair
stated that two hours before the attacks were due to start, word
had
been
received that Iraq had told Mr Annan that they would be
responding positively to
his appeal.
The US and UK had decided to put the attack “on hold for 24 hours
to give
us a chance
to study the details of the Iraqi response”.
“The first
Iraqi letter appeared to agree to resume co-operation with UNSCOM
and
the IAEA.
It was described as unconditional by Iraqi spokesmen, but the full
text of
the letter,
and in particular nine assurances that the Iraqis were seeking
about the
comprehensive
review … left that unclear. We and the Americans spelled out
that
that was
unacceptable, and that there could be no question of any
conditions.
“During the
course of Saturday night and Sunday morning, the Iraqis offered
a
stream of
further written and oral clarifications, making it clear that their
compliance
was
unconditional …
“The
clarifications, taken together, mean that Saddam Hussein has
completely
withdrawn
his positions of August and October. No concessions of any kind
were
offered to
him in exchange. There was no negotiation of any kind. Nor could
there
have been.
Nor will there be in future.”
“We do not
take Iraqi words at face value. Long experience has taught us to do
the
opposite …
we and the Americans have suspended further military action while
we
bolt down
every detail of what the Iraqis have said, and while we test the
words in
practice
…
254
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
16 November 1998, columns 607-623.
141