9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
706.
Mr Powell
passed a copy of the paper to Mr Blair, with the comment:
“depressing
reading”.382
Mr Blair
responded: “V. Depressing. Can we share this with the US? I
remain
of the view
that this issue is central. Can I see Petraeus?”383
707.
In a video
conference with President Bush on 28 March, Mr Blair said that
the UK
would be
able to make much better progress in Basra if Prime Minister Maliki
“took a
consistent,
firm line on the sectarian militia elements that were causing
trouble there”
and asked
the President to reinforce this message.384
708.
In late March,
a leading Sadrist militiaman, Qais al Khaz’ali, was detained by
the
MNF in
Basra.385
He had been
incriminated in operations against the MNF and had
direct
links with
the Iranians; but he had also been used by Prime Minister Maliki as
a channel
to the
Sadrist movement and Muqtada al Sadr. Prime Minister Maliki sought
al Khaz’ali’s
release,
but Mr Asquith described the US as
“unpersuadable”.
709.
Mr Asquith
saw this as a test of Prime Minister Maliki’s approach to
reconciliation.
He
considered that it was in the UK’s interest to help Prime Minister
Maliki neutralise a
JAM
challenge to Operation Fardh al‑Qanoon. The coalition therefore
needed “to help
him find
alternative routes into tractable Sadrists while reinforcing its
own message that
it is
prepared to deal with the biddable”.
710.
On 30 March,
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary told him that:
“The
Baghdad Security Plan is having some success in reducing the
effectiveness,
but not the
number of attacks (by, for example, improving physical protection
of
market
areas). But violence is being displaced out of Baghdad, and there
have been
a few
major, mass‑casualty attacks this week.”386
711.
On Basra, the
Private Secretary’s update stated:
“The
continued disruption of JAM ‘secret cell’ activity appears to be
reducing attacks
on the
coalition somewhat, but local politics are becoming more nakedly
violent.”
712.
Mr Blair
annotated the section referring to progress of the Baghdad Security
Plan
with the
comment:
“It is
reconciliation that is the missing part of this.”387
382
Manuscript
comment Powell on Minute [Deputy Chief of Assessments Staff] to
McDonald,
27 March
2007, ‘Iraq: Reconciliation’.
383
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute [Deputy Chief of Assessments Staff] to
McDonald,
27 March
2007, ‘Iraq: Reconciliation’.
384
Letter
Banner to Hayes, 28 March 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 28 March: Middle
East
issues’.
385
eGram
13103/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 29 March 2007, ‘Iraq: Weekly
Assessment’.
386
Minute
Banner to Prime Minister, 30 March 2007, ‘Iraq Update; 30
March’.
387
Manuscript
comment Prime Minister on Minute Banner to Blair, 30 March 2007,
‘Iraq Update;
30
March’.
133