9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
412.
The JIC
assessed that there continued to be a significant volume of
reporting on
the flow
into Iraq of extremists, whose affiliation was often unknown. It
also remained
unclear how
many mujahedin were operating in Iraq. AI was privately claiming to
be
responsible
for 80 percent of the attacks against Coalition Forces but the JIC
concluded
that those
claims were probably exaggerated. The group:
“… appeared
to have built on its local contacts and presence in the
Kurdish
Autonomous
Zone to position itself as the main organised Islamic terrorist
group in
Iraq, and
is likely to be working with other groups.”
413.
The JIC
assessed that AI was developing a long-term strategy which
suggested
that
“future targeting should focus on infrastructure and strike as
opposed to martyrdom
operations”.
414.
The JIC wrote
that, in a new development since early September:
“AQ may be
trying to establish an operational capability in Iraq … There are
some
reports
that al-Zarqawi … is in Iraq.”
415.
On 26
September, the UK Iraq Strategy was circulated to members of the
AHMGIR
416.
Major General
Andrew Figgures, who succeeded Maj Gen Viggers as
Senior
British
Military Representative-Iraq in September 2003, told the Inquiry
that by
October
2003 central Iraq was in the grip of a growing
insurgency.242
Understanding
the
insurgency took a considerable time because of a “severe lack of
human
intelligence” and
the “lack of the ability to fuse it together to gain the
understanding
417.
On 2 October,
Sir Jeremy Greenstock sent an update on the GC’s
meeting
the
previous day.244
Many
members (including the then President, Dr Ayad Allawi)
were
absent, the meeting was poorly organised and GC approval of the
2004 budget
was delayed.
418.
Ambassador
Bremer had raised the GC announcing decisions without
consulting
the CPA as
a problem because “if the CPA could not deliver what the GC
announced,
then the GC
would lose credibility, which was in neither of our
interests”.
241
Minute Dodd
to Sheinwald, 8 October 2003, ‘UK Iraq Strategy’.
242
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, page 16.
243
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, page 52.
244
Telegram
195 IraqRep to FCO London, 2 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Iraqi Governing
Council Update,
1 October’.
277