4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
75.
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Mr Williams wrote that he had been
“instinctively
against the
idea of a dossier” which seemed to him:
“… to rest
on uncertainties, as by definition we did not know what Iraq had
done
with
weapons and materials which it had been told by the UN to account
for, but
hadn’t.
That is not to say I questioned the general concern about Iraq,
only that I had
a feeling
we would be in difficulty if we were asked for evidence of things
that were
inherently
unknown to the international community.”32
76.
Mr Williams
added that he:
“… had no
inkling that Iraq may no longer possess such weapons, only an
anxiety
that we
could not know the extent of weaponry which the UN was unable to
inspect
or
verify.”
77.
Mr Williams
also wrote that his recollection was that “there was never a voice
raised”
in
Mr Straw’s presence, “or in the flow of paper … that ever
raised doubts that Iraq still
possessed
weapons of mass destruction”.33
78.
Mr Williams
stated that he had done nothing about his concerns until August
2002,
when he
“vividly” recalled that he felt “he had to do something”, and he
wrote a note
asking
Mr Straw, when he returned from holiday, to try to persuade
Mr Blair “to forget
about a
dossier”.34
He had
argued that the Government should not take it upon
itself
to prove
what the inspectors had not been able to prove. The note was
overtaken by
Mr Blair’s
announcement at Sedgefield, which is addressed later in the
Section, and
Mr Williams
did not receive a response.
79.
The Government
has been unable to find either Mr Williams’ minute of 2 August
or
any
subsequent minute to Mr Straw in August 2002.
Mr Williams’ minute of 4 September
is
addressed late in this Section.
80.
During an
unpublicised visit to the US on 20 August, Mr Straw
informed
Mr Colin
Powell, US Secretary of State, that:
•
Mr Blair
had been irritated to find himself in the position, where the US
and
UK had been
“outed” before they had been able to make the case with
the
public for
action against Iraq.
•
The UK’s
draft dossier on Iraq did not in his view lead
inexorably to
the
conclusion that military action was the only way to deal
with
Saddam Hussein.
•
A better
case for action could be made.
32
Statement,
December 2010, paragraph 7.
33
Statement,
December 2010, paragraph 10.
34
Statement,
December 2010, paragraphs 13-14.
127