The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
234.
The Cabinet
Office stated that Mr Blair had discussed Iraq with President Bush
at
Crawford in
April, and Mr Blair had:
“… said
that the UK would support military action to bring about regime
change,
provided
that certain conditions were met:
•
efforts had
been made to construct a coalition/shape public
opinion,
•
the
Israel-Palestine Crisis was quiescent, and
•
the options
for action to eliminate Iraq’s WMD through the UN
weapons
inspectors
had been exhausted.”
235.
The UK now
needed to reinforce Mr Blair’s message and encourage the US
to
put its
planning into a political framework. This was “particularly
important for the UK”
because of
the need “to create the conditions” in which it could: “legally
support military
action”.
Otherwise, there was the “real danger” that the US would commit
themselves
to a
course of action which the UK “would find very difficult to
support”.
236.
The paper also
stated that “certain preparations would need to be made, and
other
considerations
taken into account” to “fulfil the conditions” set out by Mr Blair
“for UK
support for
military action”. The paper set them out in a form which could be
adapted
for use
with the US Government.
237.
The paper
contained a series of sections addressing the conditions which
would
be “necessary
for military action and UK participation”:
•
“a viable
military plan”;
•
“justification/legal
base”;
•
“an
international coalition”;
•
“a
quiescent Israel/Palestine”;
•
“a positive
risk/benefit assessment”; and
•
“the
preparation of domestic opinion”.
238.
The Chiefs
of Staff were not yet able to assess whether the military
plans
were
“sound”; although a “decision in principle” might be needed
“soon”.
239.
Ministers
were invited to “note” the potentially long lead times for
equipping
UK forces
to undertake operations in Iraq, and asked to agree that the MOD
could
bring
forward proposals for procurement of equipment.
240.
The Chiefs of
Staff advised that there were a number of questions
which
would need
to be answered before US military plans could be assessed as
“sound”.
Those included
the realism of a “Running Start”; the willingness of Iraqi forces
to fight;
and the
potential impact of Iraqi attacks using chemical or biological
weapons.
241.
Without an
overt military build-up, a “Running Start” military action could
begin as
early as
November, with air strikes and support for opposition groups and
small scale
44