6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
594.
ACM Stirrup
also described the impact of the difficulties with asset tracking
on the
delivery of
UORs:
“I was
clear in my own mind that the Urgent Operational Requirement
process was
only
complete when the particular item of equipment was in the hands of
those in
theatre who
needed it and they were satisfied with it. I actually tried to get
some
of my
senior staff deployed into theatre to check those specific issues,
but it was
decided
that we shouldn’t do that and that we should rely on the chain of
command.
That, I
think, turned out to be the wrong decision and now we routinely
have people
deployed
for those purposes.”
595.
Maj Gen Binns
told the Inquiry that, in 2003, he had “one of those moments
with
my
commanding officers in early March when they were saying,
‘I don’t think we can
be ready’”.316
One of the
examples he gave as to why they were saying that
alluded
to asset tracking:
“We lost a
company of Warriors at one stage. We knew that it had been
offloaded
from the
boats, but I didn’t know where it was. There were a quarter of a
million men
in the
desert and we couldn’t find this company of Warriors – empty
vehicles that
had been
taken off lowloaders.”
596.
In his
statement, ACM Bagnall told the Inquiry that:
“The
information which I saw indicated that equipments had arrived in
theatre. I did
not see (or
at least I do not recall seeing) what became known as ‘the final
mile’
once a
particular bit of kit had been unloaded in theatre and moved to
where it was
needed.
Indeed, this is arguably not information which is required in MOD
unless
problems
were identified which could not be resolved in theatre by CJO and
his
staffs or
by the staffs in MOD.”317
597.
When asked
what steps he had taken to assure himself that the forces
deployed
had access
to sufficient kit and equipment including whether he ever discussed
the
matter with
Lt Gen Reith or Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge, Deputy
Commander in
Chief
Strike Command and UK National Contingent Commander during the
invasion of
Iraq, or
any other commander in the field, ACM Bagnall told the
Inquiry:
“… it was
CDS who would routinely contact CJO, the national
component
commanders,
Tampa and others, and I was aware that he was doing so. I did
not
have any
discussions with them other than on the occasions when I filled the
role
of Acting
CDS.”
316
Private
hearing, 2 June 2010, page 5.
317
Statement,
6 January 2011, pages 4-5.
97