3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
the
Administration and out, was that the only decision still to be
taken on Iraq was
how to do
it. Now, the question on everyone’s lips is how far Iraq has been
pushed
back by the
Palestinian conflict: by the outcome of Cheney’s tour: and by a
longer
prognosis
for operations in Afghanistan.
“There is
no shortage of Bush insiders who tell us that the die is cast for
a
regime‑change
operation of some sort this autumn. But there is now a sense that
the
Administration
are for the first time really staring the hard questions in the
face: how
much
international support is needed: what smart options are available
to topple
Saddam:
above all what happens afterwards. There is a doubt among some –
no
bigger than
a fist sized cloud on the horizon – that Iraq might be too risky
politically.
“There is
no bigger obstacle than the Israeli Palestinian conflagration
…”191
522.
Separate
advice from the Embassy to Whitehall analysing recent US polls a
few
days
earlier reported strong support (88 percent) for removal of Saddam
as an important
foreign
policy goal of the US, although only 46 percent favoured using
ground troops to
invade
Iraq.192
The Embassy
concluded that US public opinion was ready to respond
to
strong
leadership: the US had been attacked and:
“… if and
when a persuasive case is made for specific action in Iraq as part
of the
war on
terrorism, the American people will be up for it. But for now, it
would be
unwise to
interpret the headline figures as depicting a bellicose and
confident US
ready to do
whatever it takes to rid the world of Saddam.”
523.
Sir
Christopher Meyer also offered advice on the US approach in
Afghanistan,
where
decisions had been taken:
“… in a
very small circle of key officials around the President. Where
Rumsfeld
(and
General Franks) have not been fully engaged, little action has
resulted.
Many in the
Administration recognise that, on the ground, there is a real
danger of
losing
Afghanistan because of a US fear of getting sucked into
nation-building. But
Rumsfeld
has, in effect, blocked all but a minimalist
approach.”193
524.
Sir
Christopher suggested that the UK should “vigorously” use the
leverage from
the
deployment of 45 Commando Royal Marines to:
“… push for
greater US engagement in international stability efforts … We
have
proportionately
far more ground forces in Afghanistan than the Americans. If we
are
not
careful, the US will try to pass to us lead responsibility for
Afghan stability for the
191
Telegram
451 from Washington to FCO London, 1 April 2002, ‘PM’s Visit to
Texas: Bush and the War
on
Terrorism’.
192
Note
British Embassy Washington, 26 March 2002, ‘US Public Opinion on
Operations Against Iraq’.
193
Telegram
451 from Washington to FCO London, 1 April 2002, ‘PM’s Visit to
Texas: Bush and the War
on
Terrorism’.
481