9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
commission).648
The new
currency and independent Central Bank also counted as
positive,
as did work to “re-establish the machinery of
government”.
1139.
Although no
immediate improvement in security was expected, and
new
structures
were “fragile”, Mr Richmond nonetheless saw grounds for
optimism, as the
Iraqi
people increasingly felt their future was in their own
hands.
1140.
The final
paragraph of Mr Richmond’s telegram paid tribute to the UK
staff within
the
CPA:
“Despite
the risks, they got on with their work and in an organisation which
repaid
initiative
exercised influence out of all proportion to their numbers. Their
courage and
fortitude
were exemplary.”
1141.
Mr Blair
and President Bush met in the margins of a NATO Summit in Istanbul
on
the day
that the handover took place in Iraq.649
Mr Blair
emphasised the need to support
the IIG
with training and equipment it needed, and for the new Government
to develop a
proper
communications strategy.
1142.
Mr Blair
suggested that if asked about the IIG imposing martial law, the
response
should be
that “the Iraqis should take tough security decisions in order to
secure
democracy,
but this was not the same as suspending human rights”.
1143.
On 29 June, at
the same NATO Summit, Mr Blair announced that the
ARRC
would
deploy to Afghanistan in 2006.650
1144.
The handover
to the IIG led the UK to review the Rules of Engagement and
the
Targeting
Directive under which its operations were conducted, to reflect the
fact that
there was
no longer a state of armed conflict with Iraq.651
1145.
Instead of
operations being governed by the Law of Armed Conflict, they
would
instead be
conducted under the domestic rules of self defence as they applied
to
ordinary
citizens in England and Wales (under section 3 of the Criminal Law
Act 1967).
The degree
of force used must be the minimum necessary to avert the risk of
loss of life
and lethal
force could only be used to prevent loss of life on the part of
Coalition Forces
or Iraqi
civilians.
1146.
Ms Vivien
Rose, Head of the General and International Law Team in the
MOD,
wrote to Ms
Cathy Adams, Legal Counsellor to Lord Goldsmith, to seek
Lord Goldsmith’s
endorsement
of the new Directive.
1147.
The revised
Targeting Directive contained a “dormant” section which said
that,
if the
situation in Iraq deteriorated so that a state of armed conflict
existed once again
648
Telegram
360 IraqRep to FCO London, 28 June 2004, ‘Iraq: Valedictory: The
End of Occupation’.
649
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, 28 June 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s meeting with
President Bush’.
650
Fairweather
J. A war of
choice: The British in Iraq 2003-9. Jonathan
Cape, 2011.
651
Letter Rose
to Adams, 29 June 2004, ‘Targeting Directive for
Iraq’.
395