14.1 | Military equipment (post-conflict)

92. Gen Granville‑Chapman had recently discussed potential improvements with

Major General Richard Applegate, MOD Capability Manager (Battlespace Manoeuvre),

who thought:

“… we used to deploy people to theatres specifically to proactively keep current and

future requirements under review; the added advantage of this was that they could

also keep theatre informed of [sic] was being done for them at home, for example

on UORs.”

93. Lt Gen Houghton replied on 9 November, inviting Gen Granville‑Chapman to note:

“I intend to formalise the PJHQ procedures to deliver systematic and coherent

progress in conjunction with the MOD sponsored Capabilities Working Group …

“We still need to improve our processes for identifying the EC [Equipment Capability]

dimension of emerging theatre CONOPS which lay in the domain of the early years

of the EP [Equipment Programme] rather than in the UOR process.”42

94. Lt Gen Houghton wrote that the EC cell’s “primary purpose” was to identify all

capability requirements. Future capability definition was determined between PJHQ,

MND(SE), Multi‑National Forces‑Iraq (MNF‑I) and the DECs.

95. Lt Gen Houghton stated: “In my judgement, EC definition and requirements

management in Op TELIC is systematic, coherent and effective.”

96. As a proposed improvement, Lt Gen Houghton stated:

“Better interaction between MOD staff and theatres would enhance comprehension

of the operating environment and keep theatre commanders abreast of progress.”

97. In conclusion, Lt Gen Houghton stated:

“… I am not so convinced that we are as good at matching up the EC dimension of

emerging CONOPS in the slightly longer time‑frame. We are looking at the issue,

which is central to the future role of the PJHQ in influencing the early years of the

EP, but beyond the time‑frame which is appropriate for the UOR process.”

98. In September 2007, the MOD’s Directorate of Operational Capability (DOC)

published an audit of force protection which highlighted the need for a better articulation

of the risk to which the military would be exposed during operations.43 The report is

addressed in further detail later in this Section.

42 Minute CJO to MA/VCDS, 9 November 2006, ‘Emerging Capability Requirements’.

43 Report DOC, September 2007, ‘Directorate of Operational Capability Protection of the Deployed Force

Operational Audit Report 1/07’.

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